The trouble with Tibet

Ellen Bork, The New Republic

2/24/2011

The Dalai Lama’s democratization project poses a challenge to the United States

Flying from Delhi to Dharamsala, the seat of the Tibetan government-in exile in northern India, takes about 90 minutes. The plane lands in the valley below the Dhauladar range of the Himalayas, a massive barrier between India and Tibet. From the airport, the road leads up to the former British hill station that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made available in 1960 to the Dalai Lama, who had escaped from Chinese-occupied Tibet the year before. The Dalai Lama lives on one ridge, in the settlement of McLeod Ganj, while on a nearby ridge sit the buildings of the Central Tibet Administration (CTA), which oversees many affairs of the approximately 150,000 Tibetans in exile.

Nehru’s gift of Dharamsala to the Tibetans was both generous and shrewd. Indian sympathy for the Tibetans and hostile posture toward Beijing necessitated hospitality, but isolating the Tibetans in a remote area avoided complicating India’s non-aligned stance by making it harder for the Dalai Lama to pursue an international agenda. As it has turned out, however, Dharamsala’s location has not been a problem for the Dalai Lama.

Despite an initial hesitation about the remote location, the Dalai Lama and his officials embraced Dharamsala, which has been nicknamed Little Lhasa, after the capital of Tibet. The Dalai Lama has become a global figure with nearly universal appeal and one of the world’s most well-traveled men. What’s more, from his perch, he has been able to pursue his twin missions—preserving Tibet’s religion and culture and, more ambitiously, building a Tibetan democracy in exile. These missions pose a challenge not only to China’s communist government, which has long opposed the Dalai Lama. But, increasingly, they also pose a challenge to the United States.

The Dalai Lama’s democracy-building effort is not nearly as well-known as his moral and religious teachings. However, by the time he arrived in India, he had already begun trying to overhaul the existing Tibetan government, which was dominated by aristocratic and monastic elites. He had launched a commission to address land reform, as well as other social and political issues. In India, the Dalai Lama only accelerated his democracy work. Under his direction, a new Tibetan constitution was drafted in 1963. At his insistence, it included a provision authorizing his impeachment. For Tibetans, the idea of removing the Dalai Lama, who is regarded as the Bodhisattva of Compassion, was unthinkable. To the Dalai Lama, however, it was a natural step in his plan to delineate separate political and spiritual roles for himself and eventually turn over responsibility for day-to-day governance to an elected leader, or Kalon Tripa—which he did officially in 2001.

The democratization of Tibetan authority has thus proceeded—and relatively smoothly—over the past several decades. In 1991, there was the creation of an expanded Tibetan parliament, which took responsibility for drafting a new charter to replace the constitution. The charter gave the parliament, or Chiteue, more powers, including approving members of the cabinet, or Kashag, and greater responsibility to legislate in matters over which it has jurisdiction. The Chitue has actively legislated in areas such as finance and administration; the CTA, subject to Indian law, has maintained authority over exile affairs. The constituency of this growing democracy is scattered around the world; Tibetans in exile are eligible to vote for the CTA in the various countries in which they live.

The current Kalon Tripa is Samdhong Rinpoche, a monk whom the Dalai Lama has addressed as his political “boss.” In November, the CTA announced the results of the first phase of elections both for his successor—Samdhong’s second term ends this August—and for the parliament. In a darkened upstairs room at the CTA complex, election officials and observers tallied votes with the aid of an overhead projector. Nearly 48,000 Tibetans, or 60 percent of those registered, voted in India, Nepal, Bhutan, Europe, the United States, and Canada. The leading candidate to replace Samdhong Rinpoche is a Tibetan-American affiliated with Harvard University.

Of course, Tibetan democracy is anathema to China’s communist government, which reacts quickly to squelch democratic activism, as it did with the China Democracy Party in the 1990s and, more recently, with Charter 08, a democracy manifesto inspired by Charter 77, the Czechoslovakian civic movement to end communism in Eastern and Central Europe. Although conducted in communities outside Chinese territory, the recent Tibetan elections weren’t safe from Chinese interference. Under pressure from Beijing, Nepalese authorities seized about 1,000 ballots in Kathmandu. Neighboring Bhutan also prevented approximately 600 ballots from being forwarded to Dharamsala for counting.

The United States protested the Nepalese action, but, in fact, Tibetan democracy is an uncomfortable development for Washington, just as it is for China. The Unites States supports programs for Tibetan refugees, the CTA’s health and education budget, democracy and human rights organizations, and scholarships for Tibetans, many of whom have returned to Dharamsala to serve in the government. And yet, despite this support for democracy in general and the government-in-exile in particular, the United States does not endorse Tibetan self-determination. Its policy focuses instead on preserving Tibet’s “unique cultural, religious and linguistic heritage” and promoting “dialogue” between the Dalai Lama and Beijing. In the 1960s, Washington took a markedly different position, even supporting and training Tibetans fighting the Chinese occupation. But, once Washington restored ties with China in order to use it as a cold war counterweight to Moscow, this approach changed.

For its part, Beijing is pressing its advantage, building infrastructure to enable the rapid growth of the migrant Han Chinese population in Tibet, in an effort to degrade the region’s culture, religion, and environment. Beijing is also waging a campaign to weaken international support for Tibet and the Dalai Lama. It has designated Tibet a “core interest” and insists that other countries, including the United States, adopt a “correct understanding” of the issue. And Washington, it seems, has retreated. Whereas Bill Clinton and George W. Bush made unusually public shows of support for the Dalai Lama (Clinton even created a senior position in the State Department to deal with Tibet), out of deference to Beijing, President Obama delayed meeting the Dalai Lama at the White House until after he had visited China. Last August, a State Department report to Congress subtly diminished the importance of Tibet in U.S.-China relations and implied that the Dalai Lama might lack support within Tibetan society. Moreover, U.S. officials publicly mention Tibet less and less in the context of China policy.

Compare America’s approach to Tibet to its history with Taiwan. Thirty years ago, Beijing was optimistic Taiwan could be coerced into uniting with mainland China, and that the United States would back that action. Instead, Congress shored up Washington’s commitment to Taiwan’s defense and created a system of quasi-diplomatic relations with its authorities. As Taiwan has transitioned into a democracy, American policy has adapted to the idea that the Taiwanese people must have a role in determining their future. Just last year, the United States sold $6 billion worth of arms to Taiwan. Why, then, has it taken such a different tack with Tibet? Why has appeasing China mattered more than supporting democracy?

Chinese leaders undoubtedly hope they can exploit America’s weak position at the moment of Tibet’s greatest vulnerability: when the Dalai Lama dies. Beijing will attempt to control the selection of the Dalai Lama’s successor, a process in which senior Tibetan monks identify the incarnation in a young boy. The Chinese government has issued “guidelines for reincarnation” that stress “patriotism” and loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing might even resort to force, as it has before: In 1995, Chinese authorities seized the Panchen Lama, the second-most prominent religious figure in Tibetan Buddhism, then just six years old, and substituted an imposter in his place. The authentic Panchen Lama has not been seen in public since.

The Dalai Lama has said that future generations will regard the creation of Tibetan democracy as one of the greatest achievements of his exile. Whether that project succeeds, however, depends in part on whether the United States, so often a key partner in international democratic transitions, brings its Tibet policy into line with its democratic ideals. When the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet, no one could have predicted that the United States would be challenged to face up to its foreign-policy contradictions by refuges on a remote hilltop in northern India. But it certainly has.

Ellen Bork, director of democracy and human rights at the Foreign Policy Initiative, writes frequently about U.S. policy toward Tibet and China

下轮和谈中国或许在等新的首席部长接任

桑东仁波切：

西藏之声2月25日报导

西藏流亡政府首席部长桑东仁波切于日前在德国接受媒体采访时表示，就藏中和谈问题上，中国政府或许是在等待新的首席部长接任。

西藏流亡政府首席部长桑东仁波切于日前在德国接受德国之声记者吴安丽(Adrienne Woltersdorf)的专访时表示，不管达赖喇嘛尊者是否要退休，藏中之间必须要进行接触和对话，解决西藏问题，达赖喇嘛尊者不仅仅要同中国政府进行和谈，还将会同世界各国领导进行协商，就此事件上达赖喇嘛是无法退休的。桑东仁波切还表示，虽然北京当局一直声称，中国政府有诚意在双方间进行对话，但至今依然在推迟和谈的时间，或许中国政府是在等待新的首席部长接任。

当德国之声问及即将要选举产生的首席部长和达赖喇嘛尊者的退休言论上有何看法时，桑东仁波切回答说，流亡藏人即将要选举产生，第三位民选首席部长，而达赖喇嘛尊者已表达要完全退休，因此，这位首席部长必须要承担更大的责任；与此同时，他认为达赖喇嘛发表退休言论正是时候，但对藏人来说肯定是一个重大的责任。

桑东仁波切还表示，虽然西藏青年会等少数藏人还主张西藏独立，但是，西藏流亡政府推行的中间道路立场已经得到了大部分流亡藏人，尤其是很多境内藏人的支持和拥护。

西藏流亡政府首席部长桑东仁波切最后强调，中国政府或某些领导一直认为，只要达赖喇嘛尊者不在了，西藏问题就会自然消失，但这是一种无知和错误的想法。

趁达赖喇嘛健在解决问题是最佳选择

美国记者：

西藏之声2月25日报导

美国资深记者姜杰（Tim Johnson）最近出版新书《深红色的悲剧——达赖喇嘛如何征服了全世界却输掉了中国战场 》，建议中国政府必须同西藏政教领袖达赖喇嘛对话，并趁达赖喇嘛健在之机和平解决西藏问题是最佳选择。

根据美国之音报道，前驻北京美国资深记者、 美国麦克拉奇媒体集团驻墨西哥总部主任姜杰 ( Tim Johnson) 于本月初在纽约出版新书《深红色的悲剧》指出，虽然海内外许多藏人主张西藏独立，但是因为尊敬达赖喇嘛所以不公开跟他唱反调，因此，姜杰认为一旦达赖喇嘛去世，再没有任何人能让藏人一致行动，年轻一代更可能采取极端的暴力行动，反而更危险。

姜杰在美国洛杉矶南加州大学的新书发表会上表示，达赖喇嘛在西方广为人知，被当成一代宗教和道德领袖，1989年获得诺贝尔和平奖，世界各国领袖多曾接见欢迎。姜杰说，自1959年开始达赖喇嘛被迫流亡超过半世纪，达赖喇嘛与中国政府之间近十轮的谈判没有任何结果，达赖喇嘛多次表示不主张西藏独立，只要求真正的藏人自治，但中共始终称他是指使藏独的罪犯，并运用各种政治、经济力量施压各国政府，不要接待达赖喇嘛。

姜杰说，现在中国很多领导人认为，只要达赖喇嘛不在了，西藏问题就会自然消失，但他认为那是不可能的，事情有可能会变得更加危险。

姜杰在书中还批评中国“稀释”西藏文化的政策。姜杰说：“1949年解放革命时，藏区汉人人口只占6%，现在已达到40%。毫无疑问的，这是稀释，问题是那些被稀释的人同意或是不同意这种程序，而藏人以及维吾尔族人不同意这样做。这就是为甚么会有这么多反抗运动。”

此外，美国外交政策倡议组织（Foreign Policy Initiative）人权与民主小组顾问艾伦•博克（Ellen Bork）于近日在《新共和》杂志上发表评论文指出，西藏发生变革后，达赖喇嘛尊者在流亡社区中着手推行民主选举等体系，而中共政府正在蓄意破坏流亡藏人的民主进程，之前还向尼泊尔政府施加压力，阻拦并抢夺当地西藏难民的投票选举箱等，虽然美国政府曾批评尼泊尔当局的这一做法，但是，同中国政府建立庞大的经贸关系后，正在消减对西藏问题的支持和关注。

艾伦•博克还批评欧巴马政府逐渐淡化对西藏问题的关注。评论文指出，美国前总统克林顿和布什执政期间，美国政府一直公开表达对西藏问题的支持，但是，自欧巴马上台以来，美国政府逐渐淡化对西藏问题的支持。评论文最后还呼吁美国政府必须加强支持由达赖喇嘛尊者在西藏流亡社区中推行的现行民主体制。

噶伦赤巴应该是伟大的开拓者

by Wang January 21,


王力雄

流亡藏人社区马上要开始的噶伦赤巴选举，首先面对一个基本选择，即要求噶伦赤巴的主要任务是什么？是管好流亡社区，还是解决西藏问题？两个任务所要求的噶伦赤巴是不一样的。如果主要是管好流亡社区，选一个有公正之心，熟悉流亡政府系统和运作，与印度政府关系密切，也擅长与西方打交道的噶伦赤巴即可，如果主要为解决西藏问题，对噶伦赤巴的要求则不同。

流亡西藏的老一代领导人在管理流亡社区方面是卓有成绩的，在解决西藏问题上也下了很大功夫。不过我接触的流亡藏人普遍对他们解决西藏问题的做法不满意，认为是沉湎幻想，走错了方向。这种看法不一定是真实，但是已经形成，包括达赖喇嘛都被认为与现实脱节。尽管达赖喇嘛的崇高威望仍然可以确保他的中间道路主张得到表决多数，但只是出于对达赖喇嘛的服从，而不是对中间道路的信服。人们内心普遍对这种选择缺乏热情。除了老一代领导人相信，多数流亡藏人都不认为会有实际结果。老一代领导人无法很有说服力地让民众看到真实前景，难以激起他们的热情.

这一届噶伦赤巴选举第一次形成了真正的竞争。考虑中国的变化和达赖喇嘛的年龄，下任噶伦赤巴很可能面临重要的历史关口，需要更加独立地担当重要使命。但是在上述背景下，很多人只是简单地为即将出现新一代领导人而兴奋，认为下一任噶伦赤巴应该是和现任领导人相反的形象，却很少考虑这个关键问题。在目前这种大规模范围的选举中，人们往往只能从外在形象认识参选者，无法了解真实情况。而参选者的竞选也是面对流行大众的层面，不能提出新的问题，形成独特的纲领。这时即使选举形式是民主的，也不一定能选出合适的领导人。

成熟的民主国家有专家、大学、智囊机构等专业团队辅佐，选出的领导人即使欠缺智慧，也可以得到弥补，谁当选都不会差太多，而流亡西藏不具备那些条件，因此要求当选领导人必须自身具备足够的智慧和深刻的思想，足以开拓新的局面，才能带领西藏走向未来。

Portrait of A Lama As A Spy

By Tsering Shakya

The idea of a Tibetan lama as a spy or agent involved in high-level intrigue has long been a popular theme for thriller writers and novelists. The Teshoo Lama in Rudyard Kipling’s Kim was not himself portrayed as a spy, but unwittingly becomes a part of the skulduggery of the Great Game. In recent years, two British Members of Parliament have written novels with similar figures: in the Labour MP Chris Mullin’s The Year of the Fire Monkey, the CIA recruits a young Lama named Ari and dispatches him to Tibet to work in the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party, where he is tasked to secure a meeting with the Great Helmsman himself and assassinate him (it was of course fantastical to envisage any Tibetan returning from India ever rising to such heights in the Chinese system). The second novel by a British politician wasThe Buddha of Brewer Street, by Michael Dobbs, a former speech writer for Mrs Thatcher, in which the Chinese intelligence services and the British compete in scouring the streets of London to find the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama. In Mullins’ yarn, the baddies are the CIA and the West, while in Dobbs’ novel the villains are the Chinese and the Tibetan lama is the hapless tool of a foreign power: the stories reflect the authors’ political leanings.

And so it is with recent accusations levelled against the Karmapa, one of the most senior and important figures in Tibetan Buddhism, in the Indian media: these too could have come from the pages of a cheap spy novel, were it not for the seriousness of the charges and the high rank of those who are encouraging such suspicions.

While the world is riveted by the news of an early Arab Spring and the drama of Tahrir Square, Tibetans are caught up in the drama of the Indian police raid on the residence of the Karmapa and the subsequent media frenzy about the recovery of foreign currency from various countries in his office. The Tibetans expressed their outrage on the internet and held vigils in support of their religious leader, accusing the Indian media of sensationalising the story, much like any religious followers who find their leaders criticized by the media. The initial response seems to have been to blame the messenger rather than address the seriousness of the charges against the Karmapa and, by implication, against all the Tibetans in India.

In this case, the action taken by the police cannot be viewed as the work of ill-informed local officials or of a shady business deal gone wrong. Of the two central accusations made in the media and by Indian commentators, the most serious is that the Tibetans are engaged in espionage against the government of India (GOI) and the most tenacious is that they are involved in money-laundering. These accusations have serious implications that go beyond the issue of the Karmapa. Even after living in India for over 50 years, the Tibetan diaspora community fails to understand and appreciate the sensitivity of its presence to
India, where these matters are seen very differently from how they are perceived within the Tibetan community. For India, the issues concern the security of the nation and the legality of financial transactions. For Tibetans, the feud over rival claimants to the Karmapa’s title seems like a religious matter internal to the refugees, but like the Shugden issue it represents for India an issue of stability in a sensitive border region: for the GOI and Indian commentators these feuds are seen not as matters of faith but through the lens of security and stability. India knows from painful experience the consequences of religious feuds, and the continuance of these conflicts among the Tibetan refugees is an unwelcome intrusion on Indian soil

The Agent of Influence Conspiracy

The charges against the Karmapa have not just come from the media, but from senior and influential commentators as well. B. Raman, a former Cabinet Sectary of the GOI, wrote of his suspicion that the Karmapa's “escape to India was probably under a long-term Chinese intelligence operation to use him to influence events relating to Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama”. Similar concerns were raised in a TV interview by Leela Ponappa, the former deputy National Security Adviser to the GOI. No amount of emotional denial by Tibetan devotees and supporters is going to dissipate these doubts.

The assumption that a teenage boy was groomed by Chinese intelligence operatives to go to India as a covert agent seems utterly fantastical. However, the concerns of the officials go much beyond the identity of the Karmapa: what is being expressed at the highest levels of the GOI and among other influential figures in India is an underlying doubt about the role of Tibetans in India and their liability to India’s long-term security. This doubt coheres around the fear that after the death of the Dalai Lama, under the influence of the Karmapa, the Tibetans could become a Trojan horse, abandon their political struggle and run into the open arms of China; or, that they will be fragmented and in some other way be used against Indian interests. This assumption does not speak well of the Tibetan political movement but for hard-nosed India analysts it is not a farfetched scenario – they view Tibetans as blind followers of religious leaders who will not question their Lama’s ruling on what is right or wrong, including in political affairs. The emotional response by Tibetans to the latest Indian media coverage confirms their piety and faith in their religious leaders, and they, as a result, for outsiders, seem no different from any other religious fundamentalists who allow religious leaders to obtain political influence.

The current moves against the Karmapa also reflect growing anxiety in India about China’s plans and a worsening in the Sino-Indian relationship. The Indian media has been at the forefront of voicing fears of Chinese encirclement and the recent arrest of Chinese nationals in India’s Northeast has further exacerbated the perception of intrigue by Beijing against India. This perception has been shaped by decades of dealings with Pakistan, where Indian security officials have experienced the use of agent provocateurs to sow social unrest and discord within India’s borders. Officials assume China operates in similarly old-fashioned ways, not aware of much more developed forms of political strategy.

There are two aspects to the assumptions found amongst Indian officials. One concerns the influence of Tibetan Buddhist leaders among their followers in the foothills of the Himalayas. Brahma Chellaney, professor at the Centre of Policy Research, noted the influence of the Kagyu schools of Buddhism in these sensitive regions. Indian officials have long known that the Tibetan exile monasteries in India are mostly populated by monks from Ladakh, Spiti, Sikkim and Northeast India, and this is particularly true of Kagyu and Nyingma monasteries. The Indian authorities are concerned about social stability and such an issue is legitimate for any government.

However, the assumption that this influence could induce people in the border regions to turn against India because of their religion fails to appreciate the deeply-felt Tibetan opposition to China. In addition, among the peoples in the Himalayas who follow Tibetan Buddhist lamas, there is a growing resurgence of local identity and increasing differentiation from the Tibetan diaspora. In all these areas, devotion to Lamas has never translated into politics. The people in the regions know too well where their interests lie: with India. And the Buddhist populations of the Himalayas constitute a tiny minority – even in Sikkim, where the Karmapa’s main monastery in exile is located, the Buddhist population is a minority. The entire Buddhist population of the border regions does not even make up the size of a mid-sized urban area in India. The ability of the Buddhist population to pose a major threat to India’s security is at best negligible. The festering perception in India that Tibetan Lamas could be a Trojan horse among the peoples in the border regions is thus clearly a misplaced apprehension.

The second fear – that one of the senior most lamas could be a Chinese agent and woo the Tibetans into siding with China – implies that senior Indian officials have serious doubts about the effectiveness of the Tibetans as a strategic asset for India in its dealings with China. The Indian security establishment sees Tibetans as loyal to their Lama rather than to the idea of Tibet itself, and so assumes that the influence of a turncoat Karmapa could turn the Tibetans easily against them. But in fact the Tibetan political movement in India and worldwide has matured towards a largely secular movement: its opposition to China’s rule is deep-rooted and it is unlikely that any Lama could counter that. The community supports the Dalai Lama because he represents that view, not just because he is a religious leader.

Another reason for suspicion among Indian commentators has been the Karmapa’s supposed lack of vocal opposition to the Chinese regime and the reluctance of the Chinese government to lambaste him as they have done repeatedly with the Dalai Lama. But this is true of all senior Tibetan Lamas: none of them make frequent anti-Chinese speeches or lead political campaigns abroad, since this has always been a task delegated to the Dalai Lama, who for centuries has had a formal political role as well as a religious one, unlike the other lamas. Inevitably, the Chinese attack him primarily as their main enemy, rather than other Tibetan lamas, whose followers would turn against them if needlessly attacked. In any case it seems likely that if the Karmapa were a planted agent, the Chinese would have encouraged him to camouflage himself as a firebrand activist. And if they had a long-term plot to undermine India through an agent of influence, why would they use a Tibetan whose ability to affect Indian society and its security concerns is almost non-existent? China would do far better in establishing alliances with a host of other insurgent groups in India.

Since 1959, the single most important failure for China in Tibet has not been the protests but the defection of the Karmapa. His flight to India in 2000 was a major setback for China’s policy in Tibet. Endorsed by the Dalai Lama as well as by the Chinese state, he would have been far better used for their purposes as a means of subduing the Tibetans inside Tibet. When the boy was installed in Tsurphu monastery, the traditional abode of the Karmapas, in 1992, it was a major propaganda coup for China’s United Front Department. Now that he has fled, not a single senior Tibetan Lama remains under their control – all have voted with their feet to come to India. For China, Tibetan Lamas are seen typically as agents of India and other foreign powers, since the vast majority of the famous ones reside abroad. One is reminded of the farmyard bluntness of the Lyndon Johnson, who is supposed to have said: “I'd rather have him inside the tent, pissing out, than outside, pissing in”: the Karmapa was infinitely more valuable to Beijing inside China than outside, because the Chinese have never succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people and cannot do so without the moral authority of the Lamas. The Karmapa was the greatest asset the Chinese had, and they would have dearly loved for him to have stayed in Tibet and to have endorsed their rule and their message of stability and unity.

Of course, it is right for the government of India to be concerned about stability in the border regions, and they are also right that the ongoing religious feuds within the Tibetan community have not helped. But these disputes are not an issue of international manipulation or something that the Indian security services cannot contain. They are conflicts created by Tibetans and by competing lamas, not designed by China. Those conflicts are now subsiding, with the respective factions burrowing themselves into their holes to consolidate such power and resources as they have been able to gain, and only history will show how these groups will reconcile their differences.

As for the Tibetans, they need to recognise that their internal feuds have implications beyond their own community and have served them badly in their political struggle – if they continue to have a system which integrates religious figures within political leadership, then religion will inevitably impact on their political aspirations and ideals. For example, Tibetan lamas from the Shugden group have already exported the feud over that issue to Mongolia and forced Mongolian Buddhists to take sides. The government of Mongolia is now wearied of this feud and maintains a distance from all the Tibetan Buddhists. As a senior Mongolian official told me recently: Mongolia does not want Tibetan religious conflicts exported to its country, and the Tibetans have now lost a potentially sympathetic nation as an ally.

Unaccounted Crores

Any story involving huge sum of money makes for a sensation: in a world of banks and credit cards, we associate cash with criminality. But among Tibetans, there is no sense of public accountability for the vast sums often accumulated by monasteries and their lamas, because they witness cash being donated every day by faithful followers in almost every monastery and temple. There is nothing mysterious or unexpected about it to any Tibetan, and probably if the Indian police were to raid any mandir, they would also find large bundles of rupees given by devotees. Equally, it is a legitimate concern of government agencies to check the source of any large sum of money and to ascertain how that money is accounted for and used. Just saying it is a donation is an explanation but not a defence, and the Tibetans, enjoying hospitality on Indian soil, have to be cognisant that we are accountable to the Indian public, not just to our community.

For the press, the fact that much of the currency in the Karmapa’s office was in foreign denominations only added to the long-held suspicion in India regarding foreign money and currencies. No doubt, Tibetans would likewise be the first to accuse a lama from the Shugden cult – usually seen as being opposed to the Dalai Lama – of being a Chinese agent if he were found with bundles of Chinese currency. It should be remembered that the Tibetans in India today are dependent on foreign donations and increasingly on Tibetans living in the West, and our refugee community has become a part of the global remittance economy. But Tibetan refugees in India can rarely become Indian citizens and so face complex regulations regarding fund transfers from abroad, and often have no choice but to resort to cash dealings rather than bank deposits. This has been an open secret and the Indian authorities are fully aware of this, as is the case with many business deals in India. As Sunanda K. Datta-Ray points out in theTelegraph:

No one mentions the Karmapa’s Saraswati Charitable Trust into which all unsolicited cash donations would have been paid if permission to do so had not been withdrawn after the first $100,000. He then registered the Karma Garchen Trust but the application to receive foreign donations under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act has been pending since 2002. Forced to retain donations as they come, the monastery ensures that every penny, cent or yuan (under 10 per cent of the total despite the hullabaloo over Chinese currency) is “diligently recorded”. Even one-yuan notes from humble Tibetans without access to any other currency are recorded

The explanation given for the Chinese currency by the Karmapa’s office is plausible: this cash came as donations from followers from Tibet or China, for whom the offering of donations to a lama is an expression of their devotion. The quantities involved should not surprise us either, not just because the Karmapa has tens of thousands of followers, but because the economy in Tibet and China has changed drastically. In the 1980s, Tibet was far poorer than India and donations flowed exile lamas and Tibetans in India into Tibet for the reconstruction of monasteries there. Today, this balance has changed. The Tibetan region has been benefited in some ways from China’s economic growth and today, the people in Tibet enjoy a much higher standard of living than their counterparts in India, and have disposable wealth to send to lamas and to relatives living in India. They can rarely donate to lamas or build monasteries inside Tibet because of heavy restrictions on religion there, and so see India as an alternative base for their temples and monasteries. Both China and India look to these ties with suspicion. The lamas in India are caught in the middle, accused by both sides as agents of the other.

The economic question is one that worries Indian strategists, for the Indian side of the border remains poor and neglected relative to the rapid economic and infrastructural development on the other side of the Himalayas. But rather than seeing the flow of money as an index of espionage, Indian leaders increasingly recognise that disparity in economic development on either side of the border poses a great danger to India. That is why last year vast sums were allocated by New Delhi for development of roads and other facilities in Arunachal Pradesh and other northern border areas. For India's security, cash donations to lamas in India are insignificant compared to India’s all-important task of speeding up infrastructural development and growth in the border regions.

The questions raised in the Indian press have serious implications for the Tibetans. On one level, the Lamas and monasteries must be accountable and maintain transparency over their funding. It is clear that the Tibetans in India are among the largest recipients of foreign donations, yet there is very little accountability to the larger public in India, or indeed to their own followers. The Tibetan settlements and monasteries are often located in poorer parts of India and their finances have a large impact on the local economy. The huge increase in land prices in Kangra and other parts of Himachal are driven by the flow of money into the Tibetan community, an imbalance that has created resentment and unfair competition for some of the local community. Without transparency, lingering doubts will remain about the sources of Tibetan funding and donations. However, such transparency cannot be maintained without clear-cut legal protection and the bureaucratic will to enable Tibetans to operate within India’s financial systems.

However ludicrous the claim that the Karmapa is a Chinese agent may be, the doubts expressed at the highest levels of Indian society are a matter of concern with serious repercussions for the Tibetan community in India. India is engaged in a hard debate regarding its policy towards China, and those who argue for rapprochement with China view the presence of the Tibetans as an obstacle and those who are suspicious of China, and once saw the Tibetans as an asset, are now beginning to doubt their reliability. The media accusations against the Karmapa have galvanised the public perception in India that the Tibetans are a liability to India’s security. The Hindi-language website Janokti described the Karmapa as “aasteen ka saap”, a phrase invoking a hidden snake. These are issues that Tibetans must address calmly and in depth rather than speaking of hurt feelings and attacking the Indian media whose job is to ask hard, unthinkable questions. Nobody likes being in the media spotlight, but in a democratic society the duty of the press is to raise questions and not to pander to religious sentiment. The onus is on the Tibetans to demonstrate beyond doubt that their religious feuds and financial activities do not pose a threat to India's security and stability

Buddhist Monk Broke Bhutan Smoking Law, Faces Prison Time

B

y Kate James

January 29, 2011

A Buddhist monk broke the Bhutan smoking law, and he may have to serve prison time. In fact, the man, who was the first charged under the new law, may end up serving five years in jail. That is a lot of time for smoking even if the nation does believe that smoking is bad Karma.

Bhutan has vowed to become the world’s first smoke-free nation, and it has passed stringent anti-smoking legislation as part of that goal. The monk was charged under the smoking law with both consuming and smuggling the outlawed tobacco. January is the first month of the new rules.

The monk was caught with 72 packets of chewing tobacco without a receipt, which is over the new law’s limit of 150 grams of tobacco per month. Since 2005, the sale of tobacco has been banned, but there has been a huge black market for the drug from Bhutan’s neighbor India. Because of this, the latest smoking law is quite strict. In fact, police are able to enter homes to search for contraband tobacco products.

In this instance, the 24-year-old Buddhist monk could be charged with a fourth degree felony, which carries a sentence of up to five years in prison. However, the man said he was not aware of the new law perhaps because he lives in a 400-year-old monastic school.

So far, the new Bhutan smoking law appears to be working well. However, this monk seems to be caught in the middle. Hopefully he will not be made an example of in this case because it would be tough to serve five years. However, if the country doesn’t stick to its guns on the law, then people may begin breaking it more often making it much less effective.

Fire gutted 16 houses in Chamkhar in Bhutan

By Samten Yeshi

BUMTHANG, Bhutan, 18 February 2011 (Kuensel)
A fire that broke out in Chamkhar town, Bumthang, in Bhutan, around 1:30 am gutted 16 houses on 18 February 2011. One person has been reported killed. Kuensel Online

A fire that broke out in Chamkhar town, Bumthang, around 1:30 am this morning gutted 16 houses on the left row of the town towards the Chamkhar bridge. One person has been reported killed.

A woman and girl are also reported to be suffered burns on the face and limbs. They are being treated at the Bumthang district hospital where three men are also treated for cuts sustained while battling the flames. Firefighters, volunteers, RBA soldiers and dzongkhag officials and residents of Chamkhar town controlled the flames around 4:30 this morning.

The 16 houses are reported to have housed more than 20 shops and retail businesses. The houses that burned down in last October fire and are being rebuilt were not affected this time.

An assessment, investigation and relief operation teams headed by the Bumthang Dzongda, Zimpoenwom, and armed officers were deployed around 5 am.

First relief operations of providing food and shelter for the victims were arranged under the royal command by His Majesty’s representative office in Bumthang.

This cause of fire is yet to be determined.

The local police have already begun investigating, while a special investigation team is on their way from Thimphu.

The agriculture minister returned from Punakha early this morning to reach Chamkhar by noon, while other assembly members of the dzongkhag were already in Bumthang helping the relief team.