下轮和谈中国或许在等新的首席部长接任

桑东仁波切：

西藏之声2月25日报导

西藏流亡政府首席部长桑东仁波切于日前在德国接受媒体采访时表示，就藏中和谈问题上，中国政府或许是在等待新的首席部长接任。

西藏流亡政府首席部长桑东仁波切于日前在德国接受德国之声记者吴安丽(Adrienne Woltersdorf)的专访时表示，不管达赖喇嘛尊者是否要退休，藏中之间必须要进行接触和对话，解决西藏问题，达赖喇嘛尊者不仅仅要同中国政府进行和谈，还将会同世界各国领导进行协商，就此事件上达赖喇嘛是无法退休的。桑东仁波切还表示，虽然北京当局一直声称，中国政府有诚意在双方间进行对话，但至今依然在推迟和谈的时间，或许中国政府是在等待新的首席部长接任。

当德国之声问及即将要选举产生的首席部长和达赖喇嘛尊者的退休言论上有何看法时，桑东仁波切回答说，流亡藏人即将要选举产生，第三位民选首席部长，而达赖喇嘛尊者已表达要完全退休，因此，这位首席部长必须要承担更大的责任；与此同时，他认为达赖喇嘛发表退休言论正是时候，但对藏人来说肯定是一个重大的责任。

桑东仁波切还表示，虽然西藏青年会等少数藏人还主张西藏独立，但是，西藏流亡政府推行的中间道路立场已经得到了大部分流亡藏人，尤其是很多境内藏人的支持和拥护。

西藏流亡政府首席部长桑东仁波切最后强调，中国政府或某些领导一直认为，只要达赖喇嘛尊者不在了，西藏问题就会自然消失，但这是一种无知和错误的想法。

趁达赖喇嘛健在解决问题是最佳选择

美国记者：

西藏之声2月25日报导

美国资深记者姜杰（Tim Johnson）最近出版新书《深红色的悲剧——达赖喇嘛如何征服了全世界却输掉了中国战场 》，建议中国政府必须同西藏政教领袖达赖喇嘛对话，并趁达赖喇嘛健在之机和平解决西藏问题是最佳选择。

根据美国之音报道，前驻北京美国资深记者、 美国麦克拉奇媒体集团驻墨西哥总部主任姜杰 ( Tim Johnson) 于本月初在纽约出版新书《深红色的悲剧》指出，虽然海内外许多藏人主张西藏独立，但是因为尊敬达赖喇嘛所以不公开跟他唱反调，因此，姜杰认为一旦达赖喇嘛去世，再没有任何人能让藏人一致行动，年轻一代更可能采取极端的暴力行动，反而更危险。

姜杰在美国洛杉矶南加州大学的新书发表会上表示，达赖喇嘛在西方广为人知，被当成一代宗教和道德领袖，1989年获得诺贝尔和平奖，世界各国领袖多曾接见欢迎。姜杰说，自1959年开始达赖喇嘛被迫流亡超过半世纪，达赖喇嘛与中国政府之间近十轮的谈判没有任何结果，达赖喇嘛多次表示不主张西藏独立，只要求真正的藏人自治，但中共始终称他是指使藏独的罪犯，并运用各种政治、经济力量施压各国政府，不要接待达赖喇嘛。

姜杰说，现在中国很多领导人认为，只要达赖喇嘛不在了，西藏问题就会自然消失，但他认为那是不可能的，事情有可能会变得更加危险。

姜杰在书中还批评中国“稀释”西藏文化的政策。姜杰说：“1949年解放革命时，藏区汉人人口只占6%，现在已达到40%。毫无疑问的，这是稀释，问题是那些被稀释的人同意或是不同意这种程序，而藏人以及维吾尔族人不同意这样做。这就是为甚么会有这么多反抗运动。”

此外，美国外交政策倡议组织（Foreign Policy Initiative）人权与民主小组顾问艾伦•博克（Ellen Bork）于近日在《新共和》杂志上发表评论文指出，西藏发生变革后，达赖喇嘛尊者在流亡社区中着手推行民主选举等体系，而中共政府正在蓄意破坏流亡藏人的民主进程，之前还向尼泊尔政府施加压力，阻拦并抢夺当地西藏难民的投票选举箱等，虽然美国政府曾批评尼泊尔当局的这一做法，但是，同中国政府建立庞大的经贸关系后，正在消减对西藏问题的支持和关注。

艾伦•博克还批评欧巴马政府逐渐淡化对西藏问题的关注。评论文指出，美国前总统克林顿和布什执政期间，美国政府一直公开表达对西藏问题的支持，但是，自欧巴马上台以来，美国政府逐渐淡化对西藏问题的支持。评论文最后还呼吁美国政府必须加强支持由达赖喇嘛尊者在西藏流亡社区中推行的现行民主体制。

噶伦赤巴应该是伟大的开拓者

by Wang January 21,


王力雄

流亡藏人社区马上要开始的噶伦赤巴选举，首先面对一个基本选择，即要求噶伦赤巴的主要任务是什么？是管好流亡社区，还是解决西藏问题？两个任务所要求的噶伦赤巴是不一样的。如果主要是管好流亡社区，选一个有公正之心，熟悉流亡政府系统和运作，与印度政府关系密切，也擅长与西方打交道的噶伦赤巴即可，如果主要为解决西藏问题，对噶伦赤巴的要求则不同。

流亡西藏的老一代领导人在管理流亡社区方面是卓有成绩的，在解决西藏问题上也下了很大功夫。不过我接触的流亡藏人普遍对他们解决西藏问题的做法不满意，认为是沉湎幻想，走错了方向。这种看法不一定是真实，但是已经形成，包括达赖喇嘛都被认为与现实脱节。尽管达赖喇嘛的崇高威望仍然可以确保他的中间道路主张得到表决多数，但只是出于对达赖喇嘛的服从，而不是对中间道路的信服。人们内心普遍对这种选择缺乏热情。除了老一代领导人相信，多数流亡藏人都不认为会有实际结果。老一代领导人无法很有说服力地让民众看到真实前景，难以激起他们的热情.

这一届噶伦赤巴选举第一次形成了真正的竞争。考虑中国的变化和达赖喇嘛的年龄，下任噶伦赤巴很可能面临重要的历史关口，需要更加独立地担当重要使命。但是在上述背景下，很多人只是简单地为即将出现新一代领导人而兴奋，认为下一任噶伦赤巴应该是和现任领导人相反的形象，却很少考虑这个关键问题。在目前这种大规模范围的选举中，人们往往只能从外在形象认识参选者，无法了解真实情况。而参选者的竞选也是面对流行大众的层面，不能提出新的问题，形成独特的纲领。这时即使选举形式是民主的，也不一定能选出合适的领导人。

成熟的民主国家有专家、大学、智囊机构等专业团队辅佐，选出的领导人即使欠缺智慧，也可以得到弥补，谁当选都不会差太多，而流亡西藏不具备那些条件，因此要求当选领导人必须自身具备足够的智慧和深刻的思想，足以开拓新的局面，才能带领西藏走向未来。

Portrait of A Lama As A Spy

By Tsering Shakya

The idea of a Tibetan lama as a spy or agent involved in high-level intrigue has long been a popular theme for thriller writers and novelists. The Teshoo Lama in Rudyard Kipling’s Kim was not himself portrayed as a spy, but unwittingly becomes a part of the skulduggery of the Great Game. In recent years, two British Members of Parliament have written novels with similar figures: in the Labour MP Chris Mullin’s The Year of the Fire Monkey, the CIA recruits a young Lama named Ari and dispatches him to Tibet to work in the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party, where he is tasked to secure a meeting with the Great Helmsman himself and assassinate him (it was of course fantastical to envisage any Tibetan returning from India ever rising to such heights in the Chinese system). The second novel by a British politician wasThe Buddha of Brewer Street, by Michael Dobbs, a former speech writer for Mrs Thatcher, in which the Chinese intelligence services and the British compete in scouring the streets of London to find the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama. In Mullins’ yarn, the baddies are the CIA and the West, while in Dobbs’ novel the villains are the Chinese and the Tibetan lama is the hapless tool of a foreign power: the stories reflect the authors’ political leanings.

And so it is with recent accusations levelled against the Karmapa, one of the most senior and important figures in Tibetan Buddhism, in the Indian media: these too could have come from the pages of a cheap spy novel, were it not for the seriousness of the charges and the high rank of those who are encouraging such suspicions.

While the world is riveted by the news of an early Arab Spring and the drama of Tahrir Square, Tibetans are caught up in the drama of the Indian police raid on the residence of the Karmapa and the subsequent media frenzy about the recovery of foreign currency from various countries in his office. The Tibetans expressed their outrage on the internet and held vigils in support of their religious leader, accusing the Indian media of sensationalising the story, much like any religious followers who find their leaders criticized by the media. The initial response seems to have been to blame the messenger rather than address the seriousness of the charges against the Karmapa and, by implication, against all the Tibetans in India.

In this case, the action taken by the police cannot be viewed as the work of ill-informed local officials or of a shady business deal gone wrong. Of the two central accusations made in the media and by Indian commentators, the most serious is that the Tibetans are engaged in espionage against the government of India (GOI) and the most tenacious is that they are involved in money-laundering. These accusations have serious implications that go beyond the issue of the Karmapa. Even after living in India for over 50 years, the Tibetan diaspora community fails to understand and appreciate the sensitivity of its presence to
India, where these matters are seen very differently from how they are perceived within the Tibetan community. For India, the issues concern the security of the nation and the legality of financial transactions. For Tibetans, the feud over rival claimants to the Karmapa’s title seems like a religious matter internal to the refugees, but like the Shugden issue it represents for India an issue of stability in a sensitive border region: for the GOI and Indian commentators these feuds are seen not as matters of faith but through the lens of security and stability. India knows from painful experience the consequences of religious feuds, and the continuance of these conflicts among the Tibetan refugees is an unwelcome intrusion on Indian soil

The Agent of Influence Conspiracy

The charges against the Karmapa have not just come from the media, but from senior and influential commentators as well. B. Raman, a former Cabinet Sectary of the GOI, wrote of his suspicion that the Karmapa's “escape to India was probably under a long-term Chinese intelligence operation to use him to influence events relating to Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama”. Similar concerns were raised in a TV interview by Leela Ponappa, the former deputy National Security Adviser to the GOI. No amount of emotional denial by Tibetan devotees and supporters is going to dissipate these doubts.

The assumption that a teenage boy was groomed by Chinese intelligence operatives to go to India as a covert agent seems utterly fantastical. However, the concerns of the officials go much beyond the identity of the Karmapa: what is being expressed at the highest levels of the GOI and among other influential figures in India is an underlying doubt about the role of Tibetans in India and their liability to India’s long-term security. This doubt coheres around the fear that after the death of the Dalai Lama, under the influence of the Karmapa, the Tibetans could become a Trojan horse, abandon their political struggle and run into the open arms of China; or, that they will be fragmented and in some other way be used against Indian interests. This assumption does not speak well of the Tibetan political movement but for hard-nosed India analysts it is not a farfetched scenario – they view Tibetans as blind followers of religious leaders who will not question their Lama’s ruling on what is right or wrong, including in political affairs. The emotional response by Tibetans to the latest Indian media coverage confirms their piety and faith in their religious leaders, and they, as a result, for outsiders, seem no different from any other religious fundamentalists who allow religious leaders to obtain political influence.

The current moves against the Karmapa also reflect growing anxiety in India about China’s plans and a worsening in the Sino-Indian relationship. The Indian media has been at the forefront of voicing fears of Chinese encirclement and the recent arrest of Chinese nationals in India’s Northeast has further exacerbated the perception of intrigue by Beijing against India. This perception has been shaped by decades of dealings with Pakistan, where Indian security officials have experienced the use of agent provocateurs to sow social unrest and discord within India’s borders. Officials assume China operates in similarly old-fashioned ways, not aware of much more developed forms of political strategy.

There are two aspects to the assumptions found amongst Indian officials. One concerns the influence of Tibetan Buddhist leaders among their followers in the foothills of the Himalayas. Brahma Chellaney, professor at the Centre of Policy Research, noted the influence of the Kagyu schools of Buddhism in these sensitive regions. Indian officials have long known that the Tibetan exile monasteries in India are mostly populated by monks from Ladakh, Spiti, Sikkim and Northeast India, and this is particularly true of Kagyu and Nyingma monasteries. The Indian authorities are concerned about social stability and such an issue is legitimate for any government.

However, the assumption that this influence could induce people in the border regions to turn against India because of their religion fails to appreciate the deeply-felt Tibetan opposition to China. In addition, among the peoples in the Himalayas who follow Tibetan Buddhist lamas, there is a growing resurgence of local identity and increasing differentiation from the Tibetan diaspora. In all these areas, devotion to Lamas has never translated into politics. The people in the regions know too well where their interests lie: with India. And the Buddhist populations of the Himalayas constitute a tiny minority – even in Sikkim, where the Karmapa’s main monastery in exile is located, the Buddhist population is a minority. The entire Buddhist population of the border regions does not even make up the size of a mid-sized urban area in India. The ability of the Buddhist population to pose a major threat to India’s security is at best negligible. The festering perception in India that Tibetan Lamas could be a Trojan horse among the peoples in the border regions is thus clearly a misplaced apprehension.

The second fear – that one of the senior most lamas could be a Chinese agent and woo the Tibetans into siding with China – implies that senior Indian officials have serious doubts about the effectiveness of the Tibetans as a strategic asset for India in its dealings with China. The Indian security establishment sees Tibetans as loyal to their Lama rather than to the idea of Tibet itself, and so assumes that the influence of a turncoat Karmapa could turn the Tibetans easily against them. But in fact the Tibetan political movement in India and worldwide has matured towards a largely secular movement: its opposition to China’s rule is deep-rooted and it is unlikely that any Lama could counter that. The community supports the Dalai Lama because he represents that view, not just because he is a religious leader.

Another reason for suspicion among Indian commentators has been the Karmapa’s supposed lack of vocal opposition to the Chinese regime and the reluctance of the Chinese government to lambaste him as they have done repeatedly with the Dalai Lama. But this is true of all senior Tibetan Lamas: none of them make frequent anti-Chinese speeches or lead political campaigns abroad, since this has always been a task delegated to the Dalai Lama, who for centuries has had a formal political role as well as a religious one, unlike the other lamas. Inevitably, the Chinese attack him primarily as their main enemy, rather than other Tibetan lamas, whose followers would turn against them if needlessly attacked. In any case it seems likely that if the Karmapa were a planted agent, the Chinese would have encouraged him to camouflage himself as a firebrand activist. And if they had a long-term plot to undermine India through an agent of influence, why would they use a Tibetan whose ability to affect Indian society and its security concerns is almost non-existent? China would do far better in establishing alliances with a host of other insurgent groups in India.

Since 1959, the single most important failure for China in Tibet has not been the protests but the defection of the Karmapa. His flight to India in 2000 was a major setback for China’s policy in Tibet. Endorsed by the Dalai Lama as well as by the Chinese state, he would have been far better used for their purposes as a means of subduing the Tibetans inside Tibet. When the boy was installed in Tsurphu monastery, the traditional abode of the Karmapas, in 1992, it was a major propaganda coup for China’s United Front Department. Now that he has fled, not a single senior Tibetan Lama remains under their control – all have voted with their feet to come to India. For China, Tibetan Lamas are seen typically as agents of India and other foreign powers, since the vast majority of the famous ones reside abroad. One is reminded of the farmyard bluntness of the Lyndon Johnson, who is supposed to have said: “I'd rather have him inside the tent, pissing out, than outside, pissing in”: the Karmapa was infinitely more valuable to Beijing inside China than outside, because the Chinese have never succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people and cannot do so without the moral authority of the Lamas. The Karmapa was the greatest asset the Chinese had, and they would have dearly loved for him to have stayed in Tibet and to have endorsed their rule and their message of stability and unity.

Of course, it is right for the government of India to be concerned about stability in the border regions, and they are also right that the ongoing religious feuds within the Tibetan community have not helped. But these disputes are not an issue of international manipulation or something that the Indian security services cannot contain. They are conflicts created by Tibetans and by competing lamas, not designed by China. Those conflicts are now subsiding, with the respective factions burrowing themselves into their holes to consolidate such power and resources as they have been able to gain, and only history will show how these groups will reconcile their differences.

As for the Tibetans, they need to recognise that their internal feuds have implications beyond their own community and have served them badly in their political struggle – if they continue to have a system which integrates religious figures within political leadership, then religion will inevitably impact on their political aspirations and ideals. For example, Tibetan lamas from the Shugden group have already exported the feud over that issue to Mongolia and forced Mongolian Buddhists to take sides. The government of Mongolia is now wearied of this feud and maintains a distance from all the Tibetan Buddhists. As a senior Mongolian official told me recently: Mongolia does not want Tibetan religious conflicts exported to its country, and the Tibetans have now lost a potentially sympathetic nation as an ally.

Unaccounted Crores

Any story involving huge sum of money makes for a sensation: in a world of banks and credit cards, we associate cash with criminality. But among Tibetans, there is no sense of public accountability for the vast sums often accumulated by monasteries and their lamas, because they witness cash being donated every day by faithful followers in almost every monastery and temple. There is nothing mysterious or unexpected about it to any Tibetan, and probably if the Indian police were to raid any mandir, they would also find large bundles of rupees given by devotees. Equally, it is a legitimate concern of government agencies to check the source of any large sum of money and to ascertain how that money is accounted for and used. Just saying it is a donation is an explanation but not a defence, and the Tibetans, enjoying hospitality on Indian soil, have to be cognisant that we are accountable to the Indian public, not just to our community.

For the press, the fact that much of the currency in the Karmapa’s office was in foreign denominations only added to the long-held suspicion in India regarding foreign money and currencies. No doubt, Tibetans would likewise be the first to accuse a lama from the Shugden cult – usually seen as being opposed to the Dalai Lama – of being a Chinese agent if he were found with bundles of Chinese currency. It should be remembered that the Tibetans in India today are dependent on foreign donations and increasingly on Tibetans living in the West, and our refugee community has become a part of the global remittance economy. But Tibetan refugees in India can rarely become Indian citizens and so face complex regulations regarding fund transfers from abroad, and often have no choice but to resort to cash dealings rather than bank deposits. This has been an open secret and the Indian authorities are fully aware of this, as is the case with many business deals in India. As Sunanda K. Datta-Ray points out in theTelegraph:

No one mentions the Karmapa’s Saraswati Charitable Trust into which all unsolicited cash donations would have been paid if permission to do so had not been withdrawn after the first $100,000. He then registered the Karma Garchen Trust but the application to receive foreign donations under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act has been pending since 2002. Forced to retain donations as they come, the monastery ensures that every penny, cent or yuan (under 10 per cent of the total despite the hullabaloo over Chinese currency) is “diligently recorded”. Even one-yuan notes from humble Tibetans without access to any other currency are recorded

The explanation given for the Chinese currency by the Karmapa’s office is plausible: this cash came as donations from followers from Tibet or China, for whom the offering of donations to a lama is an expression of their devotion. The quantities involved should not surprise us either, not just because the Karmapa has tens of thousands of followers, but because the economy in Tibet and China has changed drastically. In the 1980s, Tibet was far poorer than India and donations flowed exile lamas and Tibetans in India into Tibet for the reconstruction of monasteries there. Today, this balance has changed. The Tibetan region has been benefited in some ways from China’s economic growth and today, the people in Tibet enjoy a much higher standard of living than their counterparts in India, and have disposable wealth to send to lamas and to relatives living in India. They can rarely donate to lamas or build monasteries inside Tibet because of heavy restrictions on religion there, and so see India as an alternative base for their temples and monasteries. Both China and India look to these ties with suspicion. The lamas in India are caught in the middle, accused by both sides as agents of the other.

The economic question is one that worries Indian strategists, for the Indian side of the border remains poor and neglected relative to the rapid economic and infrastructural development on the other side of the Himalayas. But rather than seeing the flow of money as an index of espionage, Indian leaders increasingly recognise that disparity in economic development on either side of the border poses a great danger to India. That is why last year vast sums were allocated by New Delhi for development of roads and other facilities in Arunachal Pradesh and other northern border areas. For India's security, cash donations to lamas in India are insignificant compared to India’s all-important task of speeding up infrastructural development and growth in the border regions.

The questions raised in the Indian press have serious implications for the Tibetans. On one level, the Lamas and monasteries must be accountable and maintain transparency over their funding. It is clear that the Tibetans in India are among the largest recipients of foreign donations, yet there is very little accountability to the larger public in India, or indeed to their own followers. The Tibetan settlements and monasteries are often located in poorer parts of India and their finances have a large impact on the local economy. The huge increase in land prices in Kangra and other parts of Himachal are driven by the flow of money into the Tibetan community, an imbalance that has created resentment and unfair competition for some of the local community. Without transparency, lingering doubts will remain about the sources of Tibetan funding and donations. However, such transparency cannot be maintained without clear-cut legal protection and the bureaucratic will to enable Tibetans to operate within India’s financial systems.

However ludicrous the claim that the Karmapa is a Chinese agent may be, the doubts expressed at the highest levels of Indian society are a matter of concern with serious repercussions for the Tibetan community in India. India is engaged in a hard debate regarding its policy towards China, and those who argue for rapprochement with China view the presence of the Tibetans as an obstacle and those who are suspicious of China, and once saw the Tibetans as an asset, are now beginning to doubt their reliability. The media accusations against the Karmapa have galvanised the public perception in India that the Tibetans are a liability to India’s security. The Hindi-language website Janokti described the Karmapa as “aasteen ka saap”, a phrase invoking a hidden snake. These are issues that Tibetans must address calmly and in depth rather than speaking of hurt feelings and attacking the Indian media whose job is to ask hard, unthinkable questions. Nobody likes being in the media spotlight, but in a democratic society the duty of the press is to raise questions and not to pander to religious sentiment. The onus is on the Tibetans to demonstrate beyond doubt that their religious feuds and financial activities do not pose a threat to India's security and stability

Buddhist Monk Broke Bhutan Smoking Law, Faces Prison Time

B

y Kate James

January 29, 2011

A Buddhist monk broke the Bhutan smoking law, and he may have to serve prison time. In fact, the man, who was the first charged under the new law, may end up serving five years in jail. That is a lot of time for smoking even if the nation does believe that smoking is bad Karma.

Bhutan has vowed to become the world’s first smoke-free nation, and it has passed stringent anti-smoking legislation as part of that goal. The monk was charged under the smoking law with both consuming and smuggling the outlawed tobacco. January is the first month of the new rules.

The monk was caught with 72 packets of chewing tobacco without a receipt, which is over the new law’s limit of 150 grams of tobacco per month. Since 2005, the sale of tobacco has been banned, but there has been a huge black market for the drug from Bhutan’s neighbor India. Because of this, the latest smoking law is quite strict. In fact, police are able to enter homes to search for contraband tobacco products.

In this instance, the 24-year-old Buddhist monk could be charged with a fourth degree felony, which carries a sentence of up to five years in prison. However, the man said he was not aware of the new law perhaps because he lives in a 400-year-old monastic school.

So far, the new Bhutan smoking law appears to be working well. However, this monk seems to be caught in the middle. Hopefully he will not be made an example of in this case because it would be tough to serve five years. However, if the country doesn’t stick to its guns on the law, then people may begin breaking it more often making it much less effective.

Fire gutted 16 houses in Chamkhar in Bhutan

By Samten Yeshi

BUMTHANG, Bhutan, 18 February 2011 (Kuensel)
A fire that broke out in Chamkhar town, Bumthang, in Bhutan, around 1:30 am gutted 16 houses on 18 February 2011. One person has been reported killed. Kuensel Online

A fire that broke out in Chamkhar town, Bumthang, around 1:30 am this morning gutted 16 houses on the left row of the town towards the Chamkhar bridge. One person has been reported killed.

A woman and girl are also reported to be suffered burns on the face and limbs. They are being treated at the Bumthang district hospital where three men are also treated for cuts sustained while battling the flames. Firefighters, volunteers, RBA soldiers and dzongkhag officials and residents of Chamkhar town controlled the flames around 4:30 this morning.

The 16 houses are reported to have housed more than 20 shops and retail businesses. The houses that burned down in last October fire and are being rebuilt were not affected this time.

An assessment, investigation and relief operation teams headed by the Bumthang Dzongda, Zimpoenwom, and armed officers were deployed around 5 am.

First relief operations of providing food and shelter for the victims were arranged under the royal command by His Majesty’s representative office in Bumthang.

This cause of fire is yet to be determined.

The local police have already begun investigating, while a special investigation team is on their way from Thimphu.

The agriculture minister returned from Punakha early this morning to reach Chamkhar by noon, while other assembly members of the dzongkhag were already in Bumthang helping the relief team.

Egypt, Tunisia demos 'in Gandhi spirit':

Dalai Lama


18 February 2011
MUMBAI, India,

Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama gestures as he speaks during a students gathering at the Mumbai University in Mumbai on 18 February 2011. The Dalai Lama said that recent popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia sat firmly in the tradition of non-violent protest espoused by the likes of India’s independence icon, Mahatma Gandhi.AFP/Getty Images/Punit Paranjpe/India

The Dalai Lama on Friday said recent popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia sat firmly in the tradition of non-violent protest espoused by the likes of India’s independence icon, Mahatma Gandhi.

The exiled Tibetan spiritual leader said the principles advocated by Gandhi had inspired US civil rights leader Martin Luther King and South Africa’s Nelson Mandela against apartheid.

“Many years ago, from the Philippines up to Chile, popular peaceful movement really brought a lot of change,” the 75-year-old former Nobel Peace Prize winner said on a visit to India’s financial capital, Mumbai.

“Now the same thing has happened in Egypt and Tunisia without a single shot from the demonstrators. So, things are changing. They are following the principle of non-violence.”

The anti-government protests that began last month in Tunisia and spread to Egypt saw hundreds of thousands of people take to the streets, successfully demanding the ouster of presidents Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak.

Sporadic incidents of violence were reported, however, mainly between pro- and anti-government factions as the authorities tried to shut down the protests with force.

The Dalai Lama, who fled to India in 1959 after a failed uprising in Tibet against Chinese rule, said the world “really needs” to learn the principle of peaceful protest after many bloody wars in the last century.

“We should not consider non-violence as a sign of weakness but rather a sign of strength,” he told a neurosurgery conference at the Taj Mahal Palace hotel, which itself was the focus of the deadly 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 166.

“The 20th century became a century of bloodshed… If that immense violence, including the use of nuclear weapons, had brought some kind of peace to the world, maybe there would have been some sort of justification,” he added.

“But that was not the case… The 21st century should be the century of dialogue… in order to create a more peaceful society.

赠与朱瑞，这雪域的雪……

作者：唯色
来源：观察



读着《拉萨好时光》，就像是看见清澈湖水的倒影，呈现出深爱拉萨的朱瑞。于是我想起，多年前，我们都在拉萨的时候，每每与朱瑞在一起，总是见她拿着一个小小的本子，只要听到拉萨的典故、歌谣、谚语，或者一个陌生的藏语词汇，她都会着急地一边追问，一边匆匆地记录。我见过那记得密密麻麻的小本子，不过我不知道像那样的本子，朱瑞她在拉萨的时候积攒了多少个。

读着《拉萨好时光》，其实只是最开头的引子，已经让我的眼睛湿润。也许别人会以为朱瑞在虚构昔日的拉萨，因为她写的达姆热正是今日所说的拉鲁湿地，而拉鲁湿地哪里有半点过去达姆热的影子？可是前不久我回到拉萨，与一位写作古典诗歌的老人谈起消失的拉萨，他说甚至到了1960 年代，文化大革命前夕，还可以看见流沙河一带有黑颈鹤在飞翔，这让他想起六世达赖喇嘛仓央嘉措的诗句“白羽之仙鹤，请借我双翅；不飞往远处，到理塘就回”，这表明当年仓央嘉措从宗角鲁康眺望远方，常常目睹那样的美妙情景，故而写下对来世的预言。当然，流沙河被填没也有三十多年了，如今密布着汽车修理厂、水果批发市场和无数的商铺、饭肆，以及越来越多的外来移民。

读着《拉萨好时光》，想起在老诗人的家里，众人对朱瑞由衷的称赞，虽然一别已过十年，还都记得她是那么喜欢听拉萨的老故事，知书达礼的她、温文尔雅的她、善解人意的她，至今让认识她的藏人们深觉与印象中的汉人很不一样。我其实写过当年离别前夕的情景：

一个过去的贵族用已经衰老的声音真诚地说，我们之间是人与人的关系，而不是狼与狼，也不是狼与羊，所以我们是朋友，这跟民族无关。

于是那个将要告别西藏的人儿不禁落泪。

哈达。敬酒歌。流动的盛宴。天下没有不散的筵席。

有一首敬酒歌的歌词是这样的：在雪域下了很多的雪，像一朵朵花儿盛开，簇拥着一座金子一般的塔。啊，我的精神，我的欢乐，我的梦。

我还写过朱瑞的，在另一篇散文中，我们一起去哲蚌寺。朱瑞说，有本书上讲，我每次去哲蚌寺，都觉得回到了一千年以前。

朱瑞突然生起一念。她要从昌都搭车去德格。然后是甘孜。炉霍。道孚。康定。二郎山。那是我走过的路线。一路的无法形容的美啊。这个担心再不走一回就老了的汉族女人。她很想赶在从此一别之前这么走一回。哈尔滨，她的家。往后就是加拿大了。她难过地说，可我很想住在这里啊。为什么天文历算所的卦说我不适宜留下呢？她几乎要哭了。

也许会有人在读到朱瑞的《拉萨好时光》时像我一样，想起一部名为《The Lost World of Tibet》的纪录片。我看过三四遍了，昨晚又看了一遍，但我依然不认为它是凭吊者的挽歌，虽然我们有越来越多的现实理由在为挽歌注解，就像影片中有个镜头虽一闪即逝，却可以瞥见图伯特的辉煌，但已是最后的辉煌，如夕阳西下，或如回光返照。

那是1958 年的秋天，为通过最高学位的考试，尊者达赖喇嘛先是去哲蚌寺和色拉寺，与最出色的佛教学者辩论，而后又去了甘丹寺。彼时形势越发危艰，入侵者已经露出狰狞之色，只剩下几个月，不及24岁的尊者将不得不踏上流亡之路。然而那天，阳光下，尊者他脚步轻盈，且微笑着，自如地展开绛红色的袈裟，这一瞬间，完全铺满整整一座山的甘丹寺出现了：从旺波日的这头到另一头，绵延而宽阔，重重又叠叠，刚刚刷白的墙体，火红的殿堂，闪光夺目的金顶，被飘飘欲飞的袈裟辉映着，示现了一个绛红色的佛之邦土。

如果此时有歌声响起，应该是《拉萨好时光》里，从藏戏《朗萨雯波》中摘录的歌谣：

知道生的末尾是死
不敢贪恋人生
知道聚的末尾是散
不敢贪恋友情……

或者，是宗喀巴大师在亲自建立了毁于文化大革命的甘丹寺后，向万千信众开示：

一切有为法，都呈无常相，
积聚皆销散，崇高必坠落，
合会终别离，有命咸归死。

且容我将这些文字赠与挚友朱瑞，这是她前生、来世之故乡的雪……


2010/12/29，于北京

──《观察》首发 转载请注明出处
Sunday, February 13, 2011

喜马歇尔邦首席部长：继续为藏人提供援助

西藏之声2月17日报导

印度北部喜马歇尔邦首席部长普雷姆•库马•杜马尔（Prem Kumar Dumal）于昨天（16日）接见流亡社区藏人传媒记者，就喜马歇尔邦对西藏政教领袖达赖喇嘛的看法，以及第十七世噶玛巴事件等问题发表讲话，并承诺将继续为藏人提供各项援助。

喜马歇尔邦首席部长杜马尔于昨天（16日）下午在位于达兰萨拉的岗拉（Kangra）县县长办公室接见十多位流亡藏人社区的传媒记者，并指出达赖喇嘛尊者是在世活菩萨。

杜马尔表示，（录音）在过去50年里，喜马歇尔邦政府一致尊崇和敬佩达赖喇嘛尊者，并认为达赖喇嘛是真正的活菩萨，该邦在过去高度重视达赖喇嘛尊者的安全问题，并为此采取各种保护措施，未来也将会更加重视，因此，敬请大家完全放心。

喜马歇尔邦首席部长杜马尔就印度有关媒体之前报道的第十七世噶玛巴仁波切有可能是中共政府的间谍的问题上表示，（录音）报道上述问题的任何媒体都可以进行批评，但是，喜马歇尔邦政府方面一直按照达赖喇嘛尊者的有关言教，为此事件进行全面调查和研究，除此之外，就这些钱是否来源于中国、有谁提供以及其用途等方面还没有做出任何评论。喜马歇尔邦与达赖喇嘛的想法是一样的，都坚信像达赖喇嘛尊者强调的那样，正义必将会取胜。

杜马尔还表示，（录音）我们需要强调的是，必须要确保居住在喜马歇尔邦境内的印度民众、藏人或外国人士的安全，而这些民众不受无端指责，并为此获得法律援助是很重要，虽然在这方面喜马歇尔邦不能全权负责，则必须有印度中央政府来做决定，但是喜马歇尔邦政府将会像过去50年一样，继续对藏人提供各项援助和支持。

- 青海草原上消失的亡灵（完整版） [动向　　] (2月18日 )


发布者：动向　　 - 2月18日
青海草原上消失的亡灵（完整版）

作者：李江琳
转自：独立评论
来源：动向

这篇文章在《动向》2011年2月号刊登时，由于字数限制有删节。这是完整版。
-------------------------------


阿嘉仁波切曾告诉我，文革后，青海的藏族老干部扎喜旺徐一再要求邓小平对1958年青海的“平叛”予以平反。在他的坚持下，青海省调来各州县的有关档案，在严密戒备下重新审查当年的“平叛”。档案中呈现的事实令在场的人目瞪口呆：当年的镇压，可以说是对少数民族血债累累。这些档案被下令重新封存，“除非太阳从西边出来，恐怕老百姓难能一见”。

上世纪五十年代末青海藏人到底遭遇了什么，可靠的资料非常难找，只能从蛛丝马迹中寻找真相。

在正常情况下，人口是一个社会最稳定的数据，因为人口变动是集体行为结果，不是一两个人想变就能变的。 而且，人口数据大多是所谓“官方数据”，无论是普查、抽查或者根据税收等数据推算，其最终依据通常都是政府的官方资料。 中国在1953年和1964年经行过两次人口普查。在研究五十年代藏地历史的时候，青海省玉树州和果洛州的藏人人口数字引起了我的注意。

我找到一些公开出版的人口资料，选出三本书作为比对：一是1987年由青海省计划生育宣传中心出版的“内部读物”《青海人口》，作者冯浩华；其二是1989 年中国财政经济出版社出版的《中国人口青海分册》， 冯浩华是编委之一；其三是中国统计出版社1994年出版，青海省人口普查办公室编的《青海藏族人口》。

一般地说，此类资料越晚出版的越准确，因为有机会勘正以前可能发生的误差和错漏；另外，政府专职办公室发布的数据应该比较权威。根据这一规律，青海省人口普查办公室出版的《青海藏族人口》应最为可靠。可是，比较这三本专著中的一些数字，发现事实并非如此。


1953年人口数字之谜
检查错误人口数字的一个办法是，各类人口数据之间有一定的逻辑联系，比如总数、比例和增长率，互相牵连在一起。在电脑统计软件还没有普遍应用的时代，在一个数字上动过手脚，必定留下统计学上不一致的痕迹。

1953 年是我考察的起点，那一年青海省到底有多少藏人？青海省人口普查办公室告诉我们：“建国后，从1950年至今，历年都有准确的人口统计数据”，“1950 年，全省人口为1518305，其中藏族人口为435335，占全省总人口的28. 62%，到1957年，增长为513415，年平均增长率为2.41%。”（《青海藏族人口》17页）。从这些数据不难推算，1953年青海藏族人口约为 467574人。

可是，该书第二章却又提供了另一组明指1953年藏人人口的数字：“1953年第一次人口普查，青海藏族人口为 251959人， 占全国藏族总人口的9%。”（《青海藏族人口》22页）这个数据比前一数据减少了215615人，相差约一半。这显然无法用正常的统计误差来解释。
玉树州的藏人人口
为了做出判断，只能比对其他来源的数字。根据冯浩华提供的数据，玉树州1953年的藏人人口为12.64万人（《青海人口》160页）。《中国人口青海分册》和2005年出版的《玉树州志》（26页）提供的数据都是126383人，看来是同一来源，这个数字与冯浩华的数字基本一致。

根据《中国人口·青海分册》，1964年，玉树州人口为102012，比1953年减少了24371人，负增长23.89%，平均每年负增长1.97%（《中国人口·青海分册》199页）。人口负增长必有灾难发生。在1953到1964这十年中，玉树州发生了两个影响到人口数量的重大事件：1.战争， 2.饥荒。这两大事件都发生在1958年之后。在1953年到1958年这5年间，玉树并未发生天灾人祸，人口不可能没有自然增长。要弄清楚1953年到 1964年玉树人口的变化，必须找到1957/1958年的玉树藏人人口数据。

《玉树州志》提供了较为详细的该州1956-1996年各民族人口统计表（《玉树州志》 107-108页），但是缺1958年。根据这份人口资料，就算1958年藏人人口与1957年相同，即159419人，亦可看出，在1958年玉树州爆发战争，一年后玉树州藏族人口减少了6209人。到1961年，玉树州人口总量为93095人，其中还包括几千名驻军，也就是说，1961年，玉树州的藏人人口约为9万以下。此数据显示，1958-1961四年的战争，导致玉树藏人人口至少减少69419人，超过1953年玉树总人口的一半。到1964 年，玉树藏人口略有回升，但从1957到1964年统算，玉树人口仍然减少了54850人，即38.7%，超过1958年玉树州人口的三分之一。


1953-1964年果洛人口数据
在《果洛州志》158-159页中，该州1953年总人口54662人。《果洛州志》171页提供的1964年果洛州藏族人口数据为50875人，根据该数据，1953到1964年果洛州减少了3787人。

可是，《青海人口》中提供的数据是，1953年果洛州人口实为10.03万人，1964年的人口数据为5.61万人。二者相比，《果洛州志》中1964年的人口数字相同，而1953年的人口基数却被“腰斩”，只相当于冯浩华数据的一半左右。


《中国人口·青海分册》列出1953年果洛州人口数字为100343，其中包括1952年“果洛工作团”和“果洛骑兵支队”共715人。减去这 715，1953年果洛人口实为99628。根据这个数据，1964年，果洛州人口比1953年减少48753人，即减少了48.9%。也就是说，该州和玉树一样，有近一半藏人人口在那几年里消失了。


《果洛州志》中有另一组与果洛人口有关的数据，即1961年该州划分阶级成份的数据：

“结合反封建斗争，在全州范围内开展了划分阶级成份工作。至1961年6月， 共划牧主712户、2848人， 占总人口的4.43%；富牧855户、3420 人，占总人口的5.32%； 中、贫牧1268 户、57965 人，占总人数的90.24%。” （《果洛州志》266-267页）

“划分阶级成份”是在果洛牧民中进行的，与军队、移民无关，而且“划分成份”是一项落实到各家各户的工作，因此，该数据是相当有用的统计数据。根据这个数据，1961年果洛州藏人人口数字为64233人，比《果洛州志》提供的1961年该州总人口数还多出一万多人。

以《青海人口》中果洛州1953年藏人人口99628减去64233，即使不考虑前几年的自然增长数，果洛州在“平叛”高峰的1958到1961年中，至少减少了35395人，达35.53 %，超过了1953年果洛州人口的三分之一。


1961年到1964年的三年中，果洛人口持续下降至50875人，又减少了13358人。无论是直接计算还是分为两个阶段来计算，得出的是同样的数据：果洛州1964年比1953年至少减少了48753人，而非《果洛州志》列出的3787人。

根据以上比对分析，可以确认的是：“平叛”和大饥荒导致青海果洛、玉树这两个自治州的藏人人口至少“减少”了118172人。


《青海藏族人口》中的数字动了什么手脚
本文开头指出，按照《青海藏族人口》中1950年藏族人口数及年增长率推算，1953年全省藏族人口为467574。再根据1953、1964年青海藏人在各州市的分布和比重表，可以推算出青海各州藏人的人口数，从这些数字可以看出，从1953年到1964年，青海省各藏族自治州人口下降幅度令人震惊。


正是这一原因，青海省人口普查办公室的《青海藏族人口》给出了1953年全省藏族人口251959这个数字，《果洛州志》也把1953年的人口数据做了同样削减。这个数字和其他人口数字都无法吻合，留下了篡改单一数据的破绽。这一篡改使得计算上1953年到1964年的人口不是骤减，而是增加。“腰斩”1953年人口数的秘密就在这里。

《果洛州志》的编者和青海省人口普查办公室似乎都没有想过，修改人口数据“牵一发动全身”，要改得天衣无缝，必须对那些年的所有统计数据都做出相应修改，并非把人口基数“腰斩”那么简单。任意修改数据，必定破绽百出。

《玉树州志》提供了1958-1962在战争历年被“歼灭”的“叛匪”人数，总计是76725人，相当于该州1959年藏人人口153270的 50.06 %；而如果根据《青海藏族人口》那个被“腰斩”后的人口基数计算，1953年玉树州人口为77628人， 4年中被“歼灭”近76725人后，3年后的1964年居然还有近10万人！

《果洛州志》中也有一组1958年的“叛匪”数据：“1958 年8 月……果洛州煽动和裹胁参加叛乱总户数10673户，人数达44523人。”（《果洛州志》423页） 《果洛州志》提供的1958年人口数据减去“非农业人口”为48219人，也就是说，1958年果洛州的总人口，包括妇女老人儿童，几乎全部“叛”了。这是违背常识的。

《果洛州志》记载的“参加叛乱”总人数可以旁证，该书中的1953年藏人人口数据54662已经是大为缩小的结果，而《青海藏族人口》中，根据全省藏族总人口251959 推算出的果洛藏族人口33259则更是人为编造。1958年“参加叛乱”总数的统计应该是较为可靠的数字，因为这个数字涉及到对这些人的政治处理（惩罚和后来的平反赔偿）。根据这一数字，符合常识的结论是，1953年果洛藏人总数据，最接近真实的是《中国人口·青海分册》中提供的10万左右。

在《青海人口》的最后一页，冯浩华留下了立此存照的说明：

“本书在进行第二校时，突然得知青海省公安厅和青海省统计局关于调整果洛藏族自治州1949年到1955年人口总数决定的报告，省政府已经同意批准。由于调整了果洛州人口数字，由此也相应的调整了过去已经公布过的1949年到1955年全省总人口数字和1950年到1953年全省藏族人口数字。所以，根据省公安厅和省统计局修正了的人口数字，本书原来使用了的过去公布过的人口数字，相应的按最新调整的人口数字进行了校正。特此说明。”（《青海人口》350页）


人口性别比之谜
冯浩华的《青海人口》列出了玉树、果洛两州三次人口统计中的性别比数据（《青海人口》31页）：

果洛州： 1953年100.60 1964年88.89 1982年99.35
玉树州： 1953年100.95 1964年80.21 1982年92.51

这组数据显示，1964年的人口统计中，这两个州的男性人口大幅减少。

1962年2月2日新华社内参中，有篇题为“青海牧区妇女的要求”的文章亦提及：“果洛、玉树许多地方青壮年男女的比例在一比七以上，有的地方达到一比十几。”

这两个州的青壮年男性牧民到哪里去了？ 有关“平叛”的资料和统计数据显示，由于“反对共产党”，反对“统购统销”，反对“合作化”，他们在1958-1961年间被中国人民解放军步兵、骑兵、炮兵和空军用现代作战方式大规模“歼灭”。除了死、伤、失踪之外，还有至少3万多人被判刑和“集训”，期间有相当数量的人死亡。有些部落，解放军所到之处，将青壮男子统统抓起来，很多人就此下落不明。短短几年间，果洛、玉树男女比例成一比七甚至一比十几，这个数字背后的事实是，那些部落里已经没有青壮男人了，部落已经濒临灭绝。那里的藏人所经历的生命损失，用惨绝人寰来形容，也绝不为过。

如今，半个世纪过去了。我们面前只剩下这些枯燥的人口统计数字。那些数字里，每个“1”是一个人的生命。这一个一个的“1”，成千成万，就这样静静消失在青海高原的牧草下面。

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Tibetan New Song 2011 Om amchok Media

Free Tibet.

Buddha’s not smiling

February 01, 2011

By Dibyesh Anand

‘Is the Karmapa a Chinese spy?’ ‘Is the possible successor to the Dalai Lama a Chinese mole?’ ‘Is this another clever ploy of China to take control of the border regions?’ The media have gone berserk with speculations about the Karmapa Lama. Sadly, the coverage has failed to do any groundwork research. This episode not only exposes the way the Indian media works but also jolts the Tibetan faith in Indian democracy and harms India’s long-term interests in Tibet.
The police raid found a few crore rupees worth of cash. At most, this may be a case of financial irregularity or non-transparent dealings by the managers of the Karmapa’s monastery for which they should be held accountable. Raising questions about a person being a spy for another country is a serious matter. It destroys his or her reputation. The news stories reflect a witch-hunt and betray the lack of an understanding of Tibetan life in India.
Ogyen Trinley Dorje is the 17th Karmapa, the oldest lineage in Tibetan Buddhism and the head of the Karma Kagyu sect. He is one of the rare lamas recognised by both the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. There is nothing conspiratorial about it. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, China was more accommodative of Tibet-based religious figures, consulting and coordinating the choice of reincarnations with the Dalai Lama and other lamas in exile. This accommodativeness came to an end with the crisis over the Panchen Lama’s reincarnation in 1995.
The Karmapa’s selection after the demise of the 16th Karmapa was not without its own controversy as there is a rival candidate, Trinley Thaye Dorje, who had the backing of a senior Karma Kagyu figure, the Shamarpa. The Shamarpa is reputed to have close connections within the Indian security establishment and bureaucracy. But most Tibetans have accepted the Dalai Lama’s choice. In fact, within China-controlled Tibet, veneration for the Karmapa is next only to that of the Dalai Lama. Even within the Gelug (the sect of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama) monasteries in Tibet, one comes across the Karmapa’s picture and it is clear that for ordinary Tibetans, the Karmapa’s proximity to the Dalai Lama adds to his sacredness.
It is true that the Karmapa has avoided making anti-China political statements and Beijing has therefore not denounced him. Again, there is nothing suspicious about this. The Chinese had refused to openly criticize even the Dalai Lama in 1959 until he made a public statement after his exile. Beijing does not want to denounce the Karmapa and thus contribute to the creation of another globally recognized figurehead around which the Free Tibet movement will mobilize. Moreover, in recent history, Karmapas have avoided overly political positions since in the traditional Tibetan State, the Gelug sect was dominant. By focusing solely on religious affairs, the present 17th Karmapa is following the footsteps of his previous reincarnation.
It is unfortunate that without appreciating the nuances of sectarian politics within Tibetan Buddhism and Sino-Tibetan relations, the Indian media portrayed the Karmapa’s apolitical stance as suspicious. Continuing speculation about the Karmapa’s escape from Tibet in 1999 reminds me of a Japanese conspiracy theory film where the filmmaker argued that he was ‘sent’ to Sikkim to get control over the ‘Black Hat’ kept in Rumtek monastery in Sikkim. Interestingly, this film was given to me in Beijing!
Decades of repression during the Cultural Revolution has not been able to shake the belief that Tibetans have in their lamas. The Indian media’s onslaught on the Karmapa will only reaffirm Tibetan respect for the Karmapa. But it will certainly backfire for India as followers of Tibetan Buddhism in exile, in the border regions, in Tibet and in the rest of the world, will resent this humiliation of the religious figure. Had it been the Shahi Imam or Baba Ramdev, would the media have taken such liberties in going to town with such an unconfirmed story?
Hardline officials in China must be laughing their heads off at the Indian media circus. They know that this will not only create confusion in the exiled Tibetan community in India, but will also create a disenchantment about India among Tibetans inside China. India has let the Tibetans down on many occasions since the late 1940s when the latter sought help and support in making their claims for independence internationally and in 1954 when the Panchsheel agreement was signed with China over the old Tibetan State. India has provided refuge to more than 100,000 Tibetan exiles. But we must not forget that the exiled lamas provide a stability and keep the people in the borderlands pacified in a manner more effective than the Indian military. Tibetans are over-generous with their gratitude to their Indian hosts and are hesitant in reminding India of a small inconvenient truth: until 1951, the disputed border regions were neither Chinese nor Indian but Tibetan. In return, the very least Indians could do is not malign Tibetan religious leaders before they are even proved guilty of their misdemeanor. Is that too much to ask?



Dibyesh Anand is an associate professor of international relations at Westminster University, London and the
author of Tibet: A Victim of Geopolitics
The views expressed by the author are personal

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Free Tibet.

写福尔摩斯在图伯特的嘉央诺布

作者：唯色 文章来源：民主中国

2/1/2011


2001年，王力雄去美国回来，说有个住在那里的博巴（藏人），叫Jamyang Norbu（译为嘉央诺布），用英文写小说，写过福尔摩斯在图伯特（西藏）（即《The Mandala of Sherlock Holmes》，1999年出版）。福尔摩斯？我自然熟悉，有小说有电视连续剧，可那都是发生在英国的悬疑侦探，跟图伯特有什么关系？事实证明我是无知的，福尔摩斯曾失踪三年，再度现身后，提及自己独自去图伯特旅行了两年，甚至到过拉萨。嘉央诺布的小说依据的，应是原著作家柯南•道尔虚构的这段经历.
王力雄还讲了一个他听来的故事，说嘉央诺布在见到尊者达赖喇嘛时，也像虔诚的博巴那样双手合十了，伏地磕头了，不过他对尊者讲了这么一句话：我们的父辈在给您磕头时从不敢抬头，而我却是抬着头的。我不太相信这个故事，因为抬着头磕头比较高难度。可不论这是演义还是真事儿，听上去，这个人在博巴中很另类。
只是，我居然在那时才知道他，可见我是多么地孤陋寡闻。再后来就常常听说他了。知道他不仅是作家，还是执着呼求让赞（独立）的博巴，而且深具影响。这两年，多亏神通广大的网络，可以看到他的博客和他的照片了。他从来都用英文写作，如果不译成中文，我就只有望洋兴叹了。他长得帅。很神气的是那两撇浓密的胡子，赞普松赞干布【1】、古汝仁波切【2】、格萨尔王都留着那样的胡子，哦不，他们的胡子是往上翘的，而他的没有翘上去，仿如哥萨克人的八字胡。他还喜欢拿一个烟斗，这倒是颇像福尔摩斯。
直到一个英文与中文比肩的台湾奇女子【3】与我在网上结识，她热爱嘉央诺布的文章，从嘉央诺布的博客上把不少文章译成中文，我这才算知道他写的是什么了。简直精彩极了，文采飞扬，思想尖锐，知识丰富。同时，我心中也有了对他这样的印象：一个愤怒的战士。我以为他是这样的，总是愤怒的，总是战斗的。而且我还发觉，他长得有点像接受中国文化教育成长的我们所熟悉的鲁迅，要是像鲁迅的话那就更是如此了。鲁迅是多么愤怒的战士啊，横眉冷对千夫指，俯首甘为孺子牛；痛打落水狗；一个也不饶恕……。就这样，我已经先入为主了。
所以，那次的见面绝对意外。当Skype的铃声响起，我扑到电脑跟前时，太惊讶了，视频上出现的竟然是嘉央诺布那典型的形象。他轻松地跟我打着招呼：“唯色啦，Depo Yin-pey （好吗）？”我很紧张，我自己都看得出来，我的脸涨得通红。
“我是你的FAN呢，”他语速很快地说。他笑着，他那标志性的胡子也拂动着。他穿着随意，很悠闲的样子，身后是一个洒满晨曦的大木屋。
这话让我轻松了，“我也是你的FAN呢，”我说。
接下来，主要是他在讲，我时不时地呼应几句，他的拉萨话非常好听。
他开门见山就说起了书。说他喜欢读书，也喜欢收藏书。他侧身，把电脑转向屋内，指给我看一层层的木架上摆满了各种各样的书，我注意到家具全都是好看的原木。
“不过，小时候不喜欢读书，也不喜欢上学，所以没读过大学。那时候，我认为写作不重要，重要的是战斗，所以我加入了曲希岗楚【4】，背着枪，跋山涉水，但没打过仗，一来因为太年轻，二来因为衮顿（尊者达赖喇嘛）不让打仗，要求放弃对中国军队的游击战。我跟许多游击队员成了至交，他们都是老一辈，1959年逃出去的。我的第一本书，写的就是其中一个老战士，康地巴塘【5】人，以前读过中国的学校，写一手漂亮的汉文，后来加入曲希岗楚，非常勇敢。”
我想起曾在拉萨，从两三部偷偷观看的纪录片中见过的镜头，乱石嶙峋的山峦间，多年来，曲希岗楚的战士们艰苦作战，已经到了难以坚持的地步。时局发生变化，中美建立外交，尼泊尔国王答应毛泽东剿灭游击藏人。为避免全体覆灭于出卖者的手上，衮顿劝诫投降的录音磁带一遍遍地在营地回响，泣声一片，纷纷垂头，有人心犹不甘而自尽……这是一段特别令人心碎的历史，不堪回首。
嘉央诺布说自己是后来才喜欢上写作的。之前写过歌曲，有着现代韵味的图伯特歌曲，最早是由他开始写的，写过好些首，自己弹着吉他唱。我很想问，有没有流传到这边，我们会唱的，像《美丽的仁增旺姆》【6】那样的歌？可我似乎插不上话，只好作罢。“还自编自导自演过话剧，有一次，衮顿还专门来看过。”我又想问，涉及现实中的问题吗？衮顿又是怎么评价的？话到嘴边，还是忍住没问。“还演过藏戏呢，”他笑道，“我兴趣广泛，什么都喜欢，目前想拍纪录片。”他问我，“你喜欢纪录片吗？”我一时没听懂“纪录片”这个词，小心翼翼地胡乱应道，嗯，我喜欢。
“后来，去日本了，”他说。在日本十五六个月，是日本经济最好的时候，在大学教英语，工资比较高，跟达兰萨拉没法相比。达兰萨拉没钱，流亡政府的工资非常低，不过日子过得很充实，可是他不得不离开。他没说原因，但我从他的文章中看出来了，他当时是呆不下去了。他因为让赞的主张，与衮顿的“中间道路”【7】不一样，所以被保守的博巴弄得很不愉快，好像还差点打架，当然那已经是过去的往事了，现在他去达兰萨拉，很受年轻博巴的拥戴。
听得出，他很欣赏日本。他说日本有自己的文化，没把自己的文化给扔了，在日本，“摩登”（现代）和传统都并存。他见过一辆很“摩登”的车开到古朴的寺院门前，从车上下来的男人西装革履，面向寺院，用日本佛教徒的方式啪啪拍手，合十祈祷。也见过日本的男孩子背着书包去上学，但是背上会斜着一把木刀，就像是过去时代的武士，却彬彬有礼。日本的街道也是古色古香的，青石板的路，他就思忖，当年，赞普松赞干布派去的特使走在中国长安的街道上，也就是这样的吧。
“很可惜，中国把自己的东西都扔得差不多了。”
他说他其实对中国很有兴趣，看过中国的很多古书，聊斋志异，三国演义，水浒传，西游记，等等。当然都是译成了英文的，聊斋志异很早就翻译了，嘉央诺布满世界到处写信找这本书，很不容易才找到了，那些神神鬼鬼的故事夹杂着民俗民风，让他看见一个趣意盎然的中国民间。相比较而言，最喜欢的是西游记，里面的佛教徒，像唐僧师徒四人，以及把佛法故事化的方式，让他感觉亲切。但水浒传，虽然写得不错，可是动辄杀人夺命，充满血腥气，那种代代相传的暴戾一直延续到了共产党时代，文化大革命达到顶峰。
对了，他最有兴趣的是文化大革命，还会唱文革歌曲呢，“无产阶级文化大革命，嗨，就是好！……”我惊讶得不敢相信自己的耳朵了，因为他的中文发音完全准确。
“有个意大利的电影导演，安东尼奥尼，本来是中国政府喜欢的人，拍了纪录片《中国》之后，西方人一看，哦，中国人一点也不快乐啊，营养不良，穿得不好，目光无神，街上没什么车，商店里没什么东西，原来中国这么贫乏啊，都在这么议论，这下中国政府生气了，说安东尼奥尼是法西斯，发动全国人民批判他。有一次，从电视上看见拉萨帕廓的嬷啦（老太太）也握着拳头喊‘打倒安东尼奥尼’，太可笑了，她会知道谁是安东尼奥尼吗？”
我笑了。虽然我那时才上小学，但依稀记得曾经批判过一个污蔑新中国的外国导演。前不久，在北京的那些盗版电影的小店里，我买到了大名鼎鼎的《中国》，迫不及待地就看，孰料乏味又漫长，没看完就睡着了。嘉央诺布连声说，没错，那是一部让人打瞌睡的电影。
“那时候，中国还批林批孔呢，哈哈。中国真的跟疯了一样，为什么要批判那么古代的人呢？而且，孔子跟林彪有什么关系呢？非得把他俩放在一块儿批判，中国人的脑子是怎么回事呀？他们好像特别能记仇，什么八国联军怎么了，都过去一百多年了，提起来还是咬牙切齿。印度也被英国殖民过，到现在，没多少印度人念念不忘。再说了，中国人记得的全是别人对自己不好，自己对别人做的事，提都不提。就像对我们博巴，很早了，赵尔丰【8】那会儿就开始大屠杀了。”
嘉央诺布说他认识一家美国人，其父是有名的基督教神父史德文【9】医生，上世纪初到巴塘行医、传教，住了很久，后来不幸被博巴中的强盗杀死了。他有两个女儿，现在已经是嬷啦了，其中一个把她父亲写的日记送给嘉央诺布，里面记载，在藏东，赵尔丰的军队把反抗的古修（僧侣）、百姓，放进寺院煮茶的大锅里活活煮熟至死，然后喂狗吃。有的人的手脚被捆绑于牦牛之间，受撕裂而身首异处。有的人被泼洒滚烫的油，活活烫死【10】。史德文本人还亲眼见到了被狗啃尽的骨骸。
“你看，他们那时候就对博巴这么残忍了，”他总结似的说。
“不过，我倒是喜欢鲁迅，”他从电脑旁取过一个相框，里面居然是鲁迅的照片，他解释说是他的妻子去香港探亲时特意买的，“这个鲁迅奇怪得很，你看他，长得也不像加米（汉人），倒像日本人。”
他又拿过另一个相框，“这是乔治•奥威尔。”他的英语发音让我不知道是谁，但说起那人写的书，动物庄园，一九八四，我再熟悉不过。
“他们都批判专制。鲁迅批判自己民族。奥威尔批判共产政权。两个人都是伟大的作家。但是西方很多人不是这样，他们喜欢共产党，喜欢文化大革命，喜欢毛泽东，喜欢专制。哈，他们骂美国，骂得厉害，可是对共产党简直‘北勒’（巴结）得很。他们甚至对我们博巴说：‘哦，你们不能批评中国，不能。因为中国就像小孩子，你们批评太多的话，他会生气的。你们要学会哄他，这样他才会答应你们的要求。’这叫什么话？！中国是个大国，很有权力，怎么会像个小孩子呢？说这些话的外国人是我最不喜欢的了，我专门写文章嘲讽他们。也有外国人说，中国就是欺软怕硬，你硬他就软，你软他就硬。哈哈，这也不见得吧。所以我们对中国，既不能抱着太大的希望，也不能任凭摆布，而是要靠自己，一点一点地做事情，实实在在地做每件事，这样才会争取到自己的权利。”
没错，有不少这个学者那个专家的，最喜欢把专制中国比喻成刁钻古怪、反复无常的小孩子，认为需要使尽浑身解数来哄劝他，让他一直保持好脾气，惟其如此方能达到自己的目的，得到自己的利益，可说实话，这并没有轻慢对方，反倒是侮辱了自己。我不满地嘀咕道。
嘉央诺布是那种跳跃性思维的人，很快又回到了老本行，说自己写了十多本书，翻译成了十几种语言，福尔摩斯在图伯特那本书还被译成了越南文。他问我有没有看过那本书，我摇头，他说以后会送我。又说有日文，旋即笑道：“呵呵，那不一样，不一样。”
“那就译成中文吧，或者译成藏文，”我说，“这样，我们就可以知道你讲的是什么故事了。”
他点点头，说正在写康地娘戎【11】的一个博巴的故事，叫贡布郎杰，乃一百多年前的豪杰人物，不但跟中国人打仗，还跟噶厦（西藏政府）也打过仗，传奇得很，“已经写了九百多页了，还没完。”那人我知道，曾夸下海口，要把拉萨祖拉康（大昭寺）的觉仁波切（释迦牟尼佛像）抢到娘戎的寺院里供奉，让各地的博巴以后都不必磕着长头去拉萨，而改道去他的家乡朝拜。
他说他还在写一本书，关于图伯特跟现代世界是如何发生联系的。“中国人喜欢说博（西藏）很落后，是它给博带来了现代化，这是一个刻意制造的神话。早年，帕廓街有多么地‘摩登’，是中国人想象不到的，有许多进口来的商品，也有许多现代科技产物的词汇，像日里（火车）、比及里（手电筒），都是有着印度味儿的英语，还有自己造的新词，像卡巴（电话），直译过来，就是通过嘴巴传送的印记。另外像Chutsoe（时间，钟表），藏语里很早就有这个词了。”
他还想为年轻的博巴写澄清历史的书，类似有本书，作者是个美国人，写于1936年，讲世界各国的国旗。“那时候，印度、澳大利亚还在英国手里，加拿大啊尼泊尔啊都没有国旗，中国的国旗还是青天白日旗，还有现在的这个国家那个国家在那会儿还都没有出现的时候，那书上就已经有西藏的‘杰达’了。”藏语的“杰达”是国旗的意思，“3•14”之后，在中国变得很有名了，叫做“藏旗”或者“雪山狮子旗”。
他说我们博巴除了佛教之外，还有很多有趣的文化，在我们的日常生活中就有，比如我们是游牧民族，这方面的智慧非常多，像木碗一个套着一个，大的里面是小的，小的里面还有小的，最小的里面装着辣椒，这些随身就可以带着到处走。还带着牛皮做的吹风筒，走到哪里，把火擦燃，吹风筒一吹，就可以烧茶吃糌粑了。“我很喜欢这样的文化，里面有许多跟别人不一样的东西，这才是属于自己的。我今年写了一篇洛萨（藏历新年）时制作卡塞（饼干）的文章，像卡塞有多少种类，多少花色，怎么做的，如何摆放，哪些属于供奉，哪些可以食用等等，很有趣。”
他侧身，把电脑转向窗户，霎那间，全是耀眼的阳光刺目。
“我住在山上，我的窗外就是山。我的妻子是医生，我们周围都是白人，没有黑人也没几个亚洲人。山下有家中国餐厅，是福建人开的，他们最初看见我，大声地喊：嗨，中国人吗？我说，不，是Tibetan。他们很意外的样子。我就说，我们Tibetan，被你们哒哒哒地赶走了，”他做出开枪的姿势，“他们更意外的样子，一定吓坏了，以为我们是被公安局通缉的逃犯吧，”他说的是汉语的“公安局”，很标准。“哈哈，也难怪他们，他们都是没什么文化的人，他们不懂这些。后来我们熟悉了，我看见他们就挥手：嗨，朋友。他们也嗨，朋友。”
“我们在这里住了好多年了，我喜欢这里，不想离开，虽然妻子在山上当医生，不如在城里当医生有钱，但这里很安静，很自然，我们愿意在这里生活下去。”
我忍不住插话说：“看得出来，你很愉快，想不到呢。”
他大笑：“你以为我是什么样子？是那种整天生气的人吗？哈哈，那可不是我们博巴的性格。我们博巴有自己的性格啊，我们总是快乐的，快乐地在自己家乡生活着，快乐地在全世界流亡着，快乐地与代代相传的信仰在一起。像我，快乐地写作，快乐地战斗，快乐地养家糊口，这样多好。这是我们天生的性格，我们不需要改变。”
我又插话：“是啊，你写塔泽仁波切就是这么描写他的。”
我指的是前不久读到他回忆刚去世的塔泽仁波切。最早流亡到美国的塔泽仁波切是坚定的让赞派，我见过他在以往岁月里的几张照片：穿袈裟时，是杰衮本【12】形象威仪的主持；穿俗装时，是卓尔不群的安多男人；而当他跟嘉瓦仁波切（尊者达赖喇嘛）在一起，他是年长十三岁的兄长，慈爱中饱含恭敬。嘉央诺布把塔泽仁波切称为“第一位让赞步行者”【13】，是因为塔泽仁波切以步行美国等地的方式来宣传让赞的主张，不过，“仁波切从来不是一个神情严肃、咬牙切齿的民族主义者。他对于让赞的信念并不是来自于对中国人民的憎恨，或者某种超级爱国的教条或哲学，而仅仅只是出于他对中国之于图伯特真正的意图没有任何幻想。”
就在这时，一个美丽的小姑娘出现在视频上，T恤上印着一个熟悉的图案，那是FREE TIBET【14】的和平鸽衔着树枝在飞翔的标记。她跟我打了个招呼就跑了。嘉央诺布慈爱地看着她的背影笑吟吟地介绍道：“这是我的女儿，我有两个女儿，我现在的主要工作就是照顾她们。”
嘉央诺布喜欢用手捻胡须，还喜欢时不时地头往后仰。我询问了他的家世，他说父亲是康巴，邓柯【15】地方的人，四处做生意。母亲是拉萨大贵族哲通家族的，一家人很早去了大吉岭【16】生活。母亲与父亲是在大吉岭邂逅的，于1949年时生下了他。我很想问他有没有回过图伯特，我猜想他或许从来没有回来过，他既没有回到过父亲的家乡，康地邓柯；也没有回到过母亲的家乡，首府拉萨。正这么思忖着，却像是被他洞悉似的，顾自说起一岁时，被仆人抱着，坐在马背上，回到过拉萨，印象最深的是见过“朗钦啦”（大象，加“啦”以示尊敬）。
我乐了：“还朗钦啦呀，不就是一头大象吗？”
“可那是一头来自印度的大象啊。听说原本送的是两头，一头献给衮顿，一头献给班钦（班禅喇嘛），可是给班钦的朗钦啦，可能水土不服吧，好像在半路上就死了。朗钦啦属于轮王七宝【17】之一，所以博巴特别珍惜它，让它住在宗角鲁康【18】，每天上午都要绕着布达拉宫转经。连喂养它的博巴都会说印度话，头上缠着白布，打扮得像印度人，免得它想家。”
天哪，这么有趣的故事，简直百听不厌！
嘉央诺布说当时就住在八朗学【19】那里，差不多有一年吧，再又原路折返大吉岭了，从此再也没有回过图伯特，虽然他是那么地熟悉那里的山山水水，至今，每天，从他的窗外，可以眺望或许仿若故乡的山峦，可以呼吸或许仿若故乡的空气……当然，这是我想象的，似乎添了几分乡愁才符合流亡者的身份。不过他真的怀有思乡的愁绪，因为他突然问我，什么时候会回拉萨？回到拉萨去祖拉康时，别忘了替他向觉仁波切祈祷。霎时间，我的心隐隐作痛。
从网上看到，失踪多年的福尔摩斯在复活之后还透露过一句话，声称自己“常以去拉萨跟大喇嘛在一起消磨几天为乐”，算算看，那大概是在1892年前后，那么，福尔摩斯见到的会是谁呢？伟大的十三世达赖喇嘛吗？其实已经有读者注意到这一点，福尔摩斯于是被戏谑成早在19世纪就企图分裂中国与西藏的英国特务了。
那么，嘉央诺布在小说中又是如何描写这段悬案的呢？等到下次在Skype上再见他时，我得记住问问。
初稿写于2008年10月16日

注释：
【1】松赞干布：图伯特历史上最伟大的君主，第一位以佛法治国的法王，公元七世纪初，图博（吐蕃）王朝第三十三代天子，统一图伯特疆域，统一沿用至今的藏文，制定以皈依佛、法、僧三宝为主的一系列法律和制度，迁都拉萨，修建布达拉宫等等。
2】古汝仁波切：指有“第二佛陀”之称的莲花生大士，西藏佛教密宗的宗师，公元8世纪从印度来西藏弘扬佛法，西藏佛教徒又尊称他为“邬坚仁波切”。“古汝”为梵语，上师之意。“邬坚”为莲花生大士诞生之地，今为密宗成就者在其法名之前所冠的尊号。“仁波切”的意思是珍贵之宝，藏人对转世再来人间度化众生的高级僧侣的尊称。
3】即台湾悬钩子，她的博客 http://lovetibet.ti-da.net上翻译的有嘉央诺布先生的多篇文章。
4】曲希岗楚：藏语，四水六岗，指1959年反抗中共的游击队，由康地藏人和安多藏人组成。地理意义上的“曲希岗楚”，是康和安多的传统名称。
5】巴塘：藏语，绵羊“咩咩”叫的草坝。位于藏东康地，即今四川省甘孜州巴塘县。清末，被血洗巴塘的赵尔丰改名“巴安”。
6】《美丽的仁增旺姆》：现代西藏流行歌曲，词为六世达赖喇嘛仓央嘉措的诗歌，曲为流亡藏人图登桑珠所写。
7】中间道路：达赖喇嘛倡导的这一政治理念，简单地说即不寻求西藏独立，谋求在中国宪法的框架内寻求解决西藏问题。
8】赵尔丰：清朝末年任督办川滇边务大臣兼任驻藏大臣，1905年-1908年，率兵入藏东康地镇压藏人反抗，实行同化藏人的“改土归流”政策，屠杀藏人如麻，被藏人称为“赵屠夫”， 却被今日的中国作家和学者大加称赞，如曾在西藏二十余年的汉人作家马丽华，在其书中“感叹行将就木的一个朝代居然出现这等有所作为的封疆大吏”。一位“研究”藏学的学者干脆撰文《Zhao Erfeng: a hero of Kham》。

【9】史德文：Dr. Albert Shelton。1904年，美国基督会派遣医学博士史德文、牧师浩格登来巴塘考察。1908年，史德文来巴塘筹办教务，以行医为入世之谋，渐得巴塘信仰。第二年在城区设立基督教堂，建立巴安基督教会小学，一幢孤儿院和牧师住宅等，并大面积栽植从美国引进的苹果树。1911年，史德文、浩格登在巴塘正式成立巴安基督教区。1919年，建立基督教半西式医院——华西医院。1922年，史德文被当地藏人打死，后葬在巴塘。他著有《图伯特历险记》（Pioneering in Tibet）。

【10】据记载，光绪31年，赵尔丰率师“剿办巴塘七沟村，搜杀藏民达数百人，尸体抛入金沙江，而且将其中的七个暴动首领，剜心沥血，以祭凤全”。赓即他又围攻乡城县桑披寺达数月之久，最后“设计毙六百余人”。将“乡城桑披寺、巴塘丁林寺无端焚毁，将寺内佛像铜器，改铸铜元，经书抛弃厕内，护佛绫罗彩衣，均被军人缠足。惨杀无辜，不知凡几。以致四方逃窜者，流离颠沛，无家可归”。

【11】娘戎：藏语，Nyarong，林间的河谷。位于藏东康地，即今四川省甘孜州新龙县，清代称“瞻对”。

【12】杰衮本：藏语又称“衮本贤巴林”, 意为十万佛像弥勒洲。即塔尔寺，位于藏东安多，即今青海省湟中县，藏传佛教格鲁派宗师宗喀巴的诞生地，格鲁派六大寺院之一。

【13】《回忆第一位让赞步行者》，原文见嘉央诺布的博客http://www.jamyangnorbu.com/blog/2008/09/17/remembering-the-first-rangzen-marcher，中文译文见我的博客http://woeser.middle-way.net/2008/09/blog-post_23.html

【14】FREE TIBET：即自由西藏学生运动，http://www.studentsforafreetibet.org


【15】邓柯：位于藏东康地，原属德格王辖属之地，1978年，邓柯县建制被取消，并入今四川德格县与昌都江达县。

【16】大吉岭：藏语，金刚之洲。位于喜马拉雅山麓的西瓦利克山脉，即今印度西孟加拉邦的一座小城。

【17】轮王七宝：佛经中记载，在转轮圣王出现时，会有七宝出现，以辅助圣王教化百姓，行菩萨道。转轮圣王是指具足德行及福报的理想圣王。而轮王七宝则是指：轮宝、象宝、马宝、珠宝、玉女宝、主藏宝、典兵宝。

【18】宗角鲁康：藏语，堡垒后面的龙王之屋。鲁康是三层建筑的小寺院，位于布达拉宫后面的一个小岛上。历辈达赖喇嘛短期隐休的私人之地。宗角鲁康为包括寺院、人工湖、树木花草在内的公园。汉语称龙王潭。

【19】八朗学：藏语，黑牦牛帐篷。位于拉萨帕廓街东面，过去是藏东康巴商人的聚居地，因搭黑色的牦牛毛帐篷而得名

藏巴哇、申藏

地名背后的历史

甘南一些地名的来历

来源：藏人文化网博客 丹正嘉


藏巴哇和申藏位于甘南州卓尼县境内，北临康乐和临洮，东临渭源。地处汉藏结合部。“藏巴哇”和“申藏”是藏语译音，藏巴哇是后藏居民的意思，申藏是西藏申扎地区“申扎”的转音。这里的人为啥自称是后藏居民呢？西藏申扎的地名为何出现在这里？，据史书记载是这样：公元762年时洮州、岷州已经是吐蕃的天下，后来，第42代藏普赤热巴巾，就是那个崇信佛教，与唐朝搞长庆会盟的那位赞普，派遣大臣噶.伊喜达吉到安多下部征收税款，他率领部众来到今天的若尔盖一带，噶.伊喜达吉才华出众，加上赞普的威望，受到当地土著人（西羌戎）诸部的欢迎，还取了当地豪门的五个妻子，其后代逐渐繁衍壮大，在安多上下左盖形成了一些大的部落，后来其后代中的江特、傲特出于发展农业的需要，率部分部众向白龙江、洮河流域发展，到了元朝，成为萨迦派卓尼寺的施主而定居现在的柳林镇，洮河流域气候湿润，亦农亦牧，因此，江特氏族及亲属、部众纷纷来到这里，与当地的土著民族和原先来这里的蕃人共同开发这里，这里就成为洮河上游一带的政治、经济、宗教、文化中心。卓尼藏族的先民就是这样形成的。吐蕃解体后，和其他藏区一样，部落割据100多年，后来成为宗喀王朝（唃厮罗）的属地，元朝时因与萨迦派及巴思八的良好关系，其地方自治地位未受影响。仍然统治着现在的卓尼、迭部等地区。到了明朝，噶.江特家族数次征服一些部族反叛，巩固、壮大自己势力，主动朝靓归顺朝廷，因维护地方治安有功被封为千户，不久被明成祖朱棣封为世袭土司，成为明朝洮州三大土司之一，其土司地位一直沿袭至民国改土归流，设立卓尼县为止，共沿袭二十几代土司500来年。，为开发、发展及维护这块地方安定作出了贡献，为加强藏汉民族关系作出了贡献，也为蕃人守住了这块生存空间。

卓尼（交尼）

卓尼，（交尼、交乃）是藏语译音。是县名也是寺院名称。这一地名的由来是这样的，元朝时，忽必烈邀请西藏萨迦派教主八思巴到内地讲经传法途径现在的卓尼县城时预言：“次第风脉颇佳，若修建一座寺院，对弘扬佛法必有莫大的禅益”。遂命弟子萨迦巴格西谢热伊西留下来建寺，在选寺址时发现，所选的寺址处，长有两颗奇异的马尾松，就以此为寺名。当地人称马尾松为“交”，“尼”是二的意思，“交尼”就是两颗马尾松的意思。后来译为“卓尼”，沿用至今。

车巴沟

车巴沟位于卓尼西南部，南临迭部、若尔盖，西临碌曲。车巴（也写作确华相）原来是部落称谓，是“齐巴”二字的转音。现在车巴后面加个沟，成了地名。这个部落的来历有两种说法：一种是，车巴的先民约在公元8世纪时就生息在这一带，先后征服了一些小部族，但在公元9世纪左右，部落发生疫情，死了许多人，于是部落首领请来居住在散木察（现双岔）一带的一位叫德丹拉仁波的法师治病消灾，据说这法师是吐蕃赞普赤热巴巾的后裔，名气很大，很快就消除了灾祸，为了感谢这位法师，部落将所辖地域和部落献给法师管理。后来这部落的后裔繁衍兴旺，到十二世纪末，进一步发展壮大，成为当地较大的部落。另一种说法是：公元8世纪左右，车巴部落先祖定居在西藏觉摩隆地区，后来部落部分族民离开家乡，向东迁移，在康区停留一段时间后，继续向东，最后到达“阿弥华干”山麓，即现在叫车巴沟的这个地方安顿下来。因他们长途跋涉，疲惫不堪，当地人称他们为“齐巴”，后来转音为“车巴”，相沿成部落称谓，至今沿用。到了明朝永乐年间，卫藏大成就师强巴更敦、罗哲样巴来到车巴沟，在现在的尼巴乡境内修建格鲁派寺院，车巴人就改信黄教，香火旺盛，成为这一带有名气的寺院，已传承二十几代上师，其中最出名的是清代喇嘛噶绕，在新疆讲经弘法时带领新疆各族人民抗击沙俄数次立战功，被清朝授予“伊利将军”之职。

巴裁（临潭）

巴裁（安多人称哇则）是临潭旧城的藏语称谓，也是临潭县的藏语称谓。是游牧部落居住过的遗址的意思。临潭地处青藏高原东北边缘，自古为汉藏民族的结合部。当地出土文物证明，约在4000年前藏族先民西羌就繁衍生息在这里。公元五六世纪（东晋16国时），吐谷浑入侵，征服这里的西羌部落，成为这里的统治者，在今县城筑城驻守，当地人称此城为“巴裁”。公元8世纪初（唐天宝年间），吐蕃占领洮州岷州，蕃人成为这里的主人。蕃人将被征服的吐谷浑人、当地土著人编入吐蕃各部，推行军事化的部落制，这里的社会也进入比较稳定时期，使社会经济有了较大发展。吐蕃解体后，这里肯定也出于部落割据状态，后来这里又成为青唐唃厮罗王朝的的属地。是唃厮罗之子董毡的领地。据宋朝汉文史书记载，当时这里的蕃人已达五万户以上。成为主要的藏族聚集地之一。到了元代，朝廷对蕃人地区实行安抚政策，扶持萨迦派，由八思巴掌管藏区事务，使分布在洮河流域的蕃人部落得以进一步的发展、巩固。明太祖朱元璋称帝后，延续元朝的民族政策，凡归顺的蕃人首领、僧官一律受封，维持原职，后来实行土司制，这里就出了个昝土司，这个部落是土著部落，叫底古族部落，是明朝洮州三大土司之一，也是明永乐年间朱棣赐姓昝，一直沿袭到民国实行改土归流制为止。马奴寺部落是临潭较大部落之一，明朝初管辖33族，其首领被封为僧纲，是洮州五大僧纲之一，也沿袭了近二十代500多年，据说是西藏萨迦派部落迁来的。明初朝廷还从南京、徐州、汾阳等地大批移民岷洮一带戎边，同时因不断战火，其他一些民族也逃难涌入，与当地蕃人发生利益冲突，蕃人部落不断遭到掠夺，导致大批蕃人外迁，到民国“改土归流”时，昝土司管辖的藏人部落只剩下七族个300来户。

以上资料来自《甘南文史资料》。

Buddha’s not smiling

Hindustan Times
February 01, 2011

‘Is the Karmapa a Chinese spy?’ ‘Is the possible successor to the Dalai Lama a Chinese mole?’ ‘Is this another clever ploy of China to take control of the border regions?’ The media have gone berserk with speculations about the Karmapa Lama. Sadly, the coverage has failed to do any groundwork research. This episode not only exposes the way the Indian media works but also jolts the Tibetan faith in Indian democracy and harms India’s long-term interests in Tibet.
The police raid found a few crore rupees worth of cash. At most, this may be a case of financial irregularity or non-transparent dealings by the managers of the Karmapa’s monastery for which they should be held accountable. Raising questions about a person being a spy for another country is a serious matter. It destroys his or her reputation. The news stories reflect a witch-hunt and betray the lack of an understanding of Tibetan life in India.
Ogyen Trinley Dorje is the 17th Karmapa, the oldest lineage in Tibetan Buddhism and the head of the Karma Kagyu sect. He is one of the rare lamas recognised by both the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. There is nothing conspiratorial about it. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, China was more accommodative of Tibet-based religious figures, consulting and coordinating the choice of reincarnations with the Dalai Lama and other lamas in exile. This accommodativeness came to an end with the crisis over the Panchen Lama’s reincarnation in 1995.
The Karmapa’s selection after the demise of the 16th Karmapa was not without its own controversy as there is a rival candidate, Trinley Thaye Dorje, who had the backing of a senior Karma Kagyu figure, the Shamarpa. The Shamarpa is reputed to have close connections within the Indian security establishment and bureaucracy. But most Tibetans have accepted the Dalai Lama’s choice. In fact, within China-controlled Tibet, veneration for the Karmapa is next only to that of the Dalai Lama. Even within the Gelug (the sect of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama) monasteries in Tibet, one comes across the Karmapa’s picture and it is clear that for ordinary Tibetans, the Karmapa’s proximity to the Dalai Lama adds to his sacredness.
It is true that the Karmapa has avoided making anti-China political statements and Beijing has therefore not denounced him. Again, there is nothing suspicious about this. The Chinese had refused to openly criticise even the Dalai Lama in 1959 until he made a public statement after his exile. Beijing does not want to denounce the Karmapa and thus contribute to the creation of another globally recognised figurehead around which the Free Tibet movement will mobilise. Moreover, in recent history, Karmapas have avoided overly political positions since in the traditional Tibetan State, the Gelug sect was dominant. By focusing solely on religious affairs, the present 17th Karmapa is following the footsteps of his previous reincarnation.
It is unfortunate that without appreciating the nuances of sectarian politics within Tibetan Buddhism and Sino-Tibetan relations, the Indian media portrayed the Karmapa’s apolitical stance as suspicious. Continuing speculation about the Karmapa’s escape from Tibet in 1999 reminds me of a Japanese conspiracy theory film where the filmmaker argued that he was ‘sent’ to Sikkim to get control over the ‘Black Hat’ kept in Rumtek monastery in Sikkim. Interestingly, this film was given to me in Beijing!
Decades of repression during the Cultural Revolution has not been able to shake the belief that Tibetans have in their lamas. The Indian media’s onslaught on the Karmapa will only reaffirm Tibetan respect for the Karmapa. But it will certainly backfire for India as followers of Tibetan Buddhism in exile, in the border regions, in Tibet and in the rest of the world, will resent this humiliation of the religious figure. Had it been the Shahi Imam or Baba Ramdev, would the media have taken such liberties in going to town with such an unconfirmed story?
Hardline officials in China must be laughing their heads off at the Indian media circus. They know that this will not only create confusion in the exiled Tibetan community in India, but will also create a disenchantment about India among Tibetans inside China. India has let the Tibetans down on many occasions since the late 1940s when the latter sought help and support in making their claims for independence internationally and in 1954 when the Panchsheel agreement was signed with China over the old Tibetan State. India has provided refuge to more than 100,000 Tibetan exiles. But we must not forget that the exiled lamas provide a stability and keep the people in the borderlands pacified in a manner more effective than the Indian military. Tibetans are over-generous with their gratitude to their Indian hosts and are hesitant in reminding India of a small inconvenient truth: until 1951, the disputed border regions were neither Chinese nor Indian but Tibetan. In return, the very least Indians could do is not malign Tibetan religious leaders before they are even proved guilty of their misdemeanor. Is that too much to ask?

Dibyesh Anand is an associate professor of international relations at Westminster University, London and the 
author of Tibet: A Victim of Geopolitics
The views expressed by the author are persona

一位印度记者的文章：不是合法与非法的问题，是有关信仰！

1月31日

作者：Gogo_Viva
翻译：Ani Pema Dechen，

来源：Facebook，原文地址 http://gogo-viva.blogspot.com
转自：维色博客

原标题：Legal! Illegal?
假如这部分钱是非法的，那几乎所有的宗教机构都要小心了！

对于这样一个伟大的藏传佛教领袖噶玛巴来说，这点钱有什么值得大惊小怪？他最近刚从菩提伽耶、每年一次的祈愿法会回来，接见很多从世界各地来的带着虔诚心的弟子，那些弟子也会供养他们最敬爱的上师，只是几百万卢比（不是美金），那值得大惊小怪吗？那如果发生在非洲，或许是。但是如果是在美国、日本、韩国、香港或台湾，当然不是！尊胜大宝法王在藏传佛教中拥有世界性的知名度，很多人全年积攒出时间和金钱，就是为了能到这里见他一面，以表达他们至诚的敬意并参加在菩提迦耶举办的祈愿法会，为世界祈祷和平。弟子们的供养不仅仅是尊敬上师并且相信上师在过去和未来的佛行事业，例如，上师提供尼院的日常开销、无家可归的人们和西藏传统艺术等。

所以祈愿法会结束后，上师得到一批供养钱并不是什么大事，尤其那些钱是来自于25个国家！那也意味着有25个国家以上的人们到印度来提高印度的经济！所以对于那笔数目的资金，人们不会感到奇怪！尤其是那笔钱是来自世界各地弟子的供养。在佛教中，只要你愿意，你可以尽可能地供养，那不是关于合法或非法的问题，那是信心！假如那笔钱被声称是非法而拘留，那么你需要证明所有弟子们的供养都是非法的理由。我们希望从世界各地来的人们不要给印度一个像‘宗教恐怖主义’的坏印象。印度作为佛陀的故乡，我们希望这件事情不要毁了印度的声誉，尤其是这个国家，还努力在保留佛陀时代的特征。

星期三整个印度庆祝她的独立日，这表示这个国家懂得自由的价值 ，那是用很多沉默的解放运动换来的今天的局面。很多年以前，第17世噶玛巴带着他的传承的责任，冒着生命危险来到印度（世界上最重要的喇嘛之一），政府友善地给与了他可以在印度停留的难民身份，然而他的行动到今天还受限制，即使是拜见达赖喇嘛，还需要审批。这个原因是来自于不明的信息，有人怀疑他跟中国当局还有着某种联系，虽然还没有人能证明那信息是什么和从哪里来。

这两天，更多的传媒声称被扣押的钱是进行非法的土地交易，调查还在进行中，但结论明显地已经出来了！

假如大宝法王住的房间可能你的房间还小，而事实上就是比我们大部分人的还小，那你什么感觉？尤其是对于那些真诚信仰他的弟子们，假如有人事先没有征得他的同意而要供养他土地，那非常正常! 在佛陀时代，须达长着（Anathapindika）就找到一个合适的地方（祗园精舍）供养佛陀，他在地方铺上金币而买地，就是为了提供佛陀演说法教。这是佛教非常美丽的传统，美丽的印度古老传统。

在古时代，供养佛陀是非常吉祥的事，今天也一样！假如你有一分钱供养佛陀，你会说不吗？除此之外，假如你非常富有，你想供养土地或房子给佛陀，你不会迟疑这么做的。你怎么会错过通过供养而积累福德善业的机会？那些不是佛教徒的人们可能会好奇那是怎么回事，那是有关信仰！在其他宗教中也有同样的例子。我们怎能否认信仰？我们怎能定义供养是非法的？美国人也是通过金钱而展现他们的信仰（我们信仰的上帝）。

所以，这笔钱就跟用金币供养佛陀没有什么不同，假如那笔钱被声称为非法而被扣留，那么请向全世界证明弟子的非法性，乃至所有的佛教徒们！假如供养是合法的，那么金钱的供养也同样合法；假如供养合法，那么一块表、一本书、一个IPAD、一辆汽车甚至供养一块土地也同样合法（can you say “no” to Steve Jobs?），最主要的是，假如人们不能定义或证明供养是非法的证据，那他们应该看到更深的一个层面，更深一层，他们会看到信仰！一旦他们看到了信仰，那不再是合法或非法的问题，而是信仰！


Legal! Illegal?

FRIDAY, JANUARY 28, 2011


If this money offering is illegal, most of Religion institutions have to be careful!

What’s the big deal for such a great and famous Tibetan Buddhism Lama--His Holiness the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje who recently just back from Bodhgaya where the Kagyu Monlam was held each year, meeting many disciples who came from the worldwide also made offerings to their dearest Guru, to have millions Rupees (not million US dollars!)? Is it a big deal? If it happens in Africa, maybe. But if in America, Japan, Korean, HK or Taiwan, of course not! His Holiness is such a great and worldwide famous Lama in Tibetan Buddhism, many people save their holidays and money of the whole year just for coming here to see Him, sending their respect toward to Him, to attending the Kagyu Monlam in Bodhgaya, India. "Monlam" is an occasion to pray for world peace, and the disciples’ donations are not only for showing their respects to Guru, but also for trusting the activities which HH has done in the past and coming future, for example, HH sponsors the nunnery daily usage, homeless people, schools and traditional Tibetan arts etc.

So it’s not a big deal for having the money after the great Monlam, especially currencies from 25 countries! This also means more than 25 countries’ people have came to India to enhance Indian economy! So, people won’t be surprised about the amount of money. Especially, the money was offered by all the disciples around the world. In Buddhism, you can offer as much as you can, as you want. It’s not about legal or illegal. It’s about faith. If the money is detained by claiming it's illegal therefore someone need to make a proof to all the disciples even all the Buddhists its illegal reason. We hope people from other countries won’t get a bad impression that India may be a country which is “religion terrorism”. As a Buddha’s home country, we truly wish this wouldn’t ruin India’s reputation, especially this beautiful country still trying hard to keep its nice characters and traditions since the Buddha's time.

The whole India celebrated the Independent Day on this Wed. which represents it's a country understands the value of freedom due to many silent revolutions for achieving to the current situation. Many years ago, HH the 17th Karmapa with the expectation to continuing his responsibility of Tibetan Buddhism lineage risked his life to India, afterward the Government of India very kindly gave him (one of the most important Lamas in the world) a refugee status for staying in India. However his action is confined till today, even visiting HH Dalai Lama still need approval. The reason is because of unknown information suspecting him having the connection with China authority. Although no one proves what the "unknown" information is and where it comes from so far.

These 2 days, most of the news reports claimed the money which found is for some "illegal" land deal, the investigation is still in process but this conclusion seems has already came out!

If you know HH Karmapa lives in a room which may be smaller than yours (actually smaller than most of ours), then how will you feel? Especially for those disciples who respect him sincerely. So if someone really wants to donate the land without notifying HH also without a consent from Him, that's normal, in Tibetan Buddhism, that's normal! During the time of Lord Buddha, Anathapindika sought a suitable place for the Buddha's residence, so he covered the golden coins on the Jetavana in order to buy it to provide the Buddha a place to proceed the Buddha’s activities. This was a beautiful tradition, a beautiful tradition in Buddhism, a beautiful tradition from the ancient India.

In ancient time, it was the most auspicious thing to make an offering to the Buddha, same as today! If you have a coin to offer to the Buddha, would you say no? In addition, If you were rich enough to offer a house even a land to the Buddha, you would not hesitate to do so. How can you miss this precious opportunity to gain your merit through offering? People who are not Buddhists maybe curious about it, but it’s faith, there are many examples to prove how faithful people are in other religions. So, how can we deny faith? How can we define offering is illegal? Americans even show their faith in their bills (In God We Trust).

So, this money is no longer different than the golden coins for offering to the Living Buddha! If the money is detained by claiming it's illegal therefore please show the whole world its proof of illegality to all the disciples, all the Buddhists. If offering is legal then the money offering is legal. If offering is legal then a watch, a book, an ipad (can you say “no” to Steve Jobs?) a car, a house even a land offering is legal! Most of all, the key point is if "the people" can't define or show evidences of "offering" illegality then they should go to the deeper part, look deeply, they'll see the FAITH. Once they see "faith" they'll realize it is no longer about legal or illegal but FAITH!

佛教不是盲目信仰必须从自身做起

达赖喇嘛：

西藏之声
2月1日报导

正在印度南部芒果志西藏难民社区弘法的西藏政教领袖达赖喇嘛于今天（1日）在哲蚌寺中传授了「绿度母开许灌顶」和菩萨戒，随后讲解第十四世达赖喇嘛所著的《中观根本论之大疏》，开示信众必须以实际行动学习和研究佛法，而不是盲目信仰或接受灌顶。（录音）

本台驻印南记者发来消息说，达赖喇嘛尊者在西藏哲蚌寺向上万名信众传法前，简要介绍佛教修行和学习理论知识的重要性。

当传授「绿度母开许灌顶」时，达赖喇嘛表示，（录音）日前一家中国采矿公司在阿富汗某个地区进行采矿时，出土了一批佛教文物，其中有一尊度母佛像。有关专家对此进行研究后指出，这些文物最少也有2600年以上的历史，如果真是那样，有望证明部分西藏学者曾指出的佛祖释迦牟尼诞辰已有3000年历史的说法。

达赖喇嘛表示，度母是观音菩萨的化身，共有 21位救度母，其中以绿度母和白度母最为流行。绿度母在藏传佛教中被认为是最早诞生，也因此被认为是最重要的度母。绿度母的绿色，代表的是一种生命力和成长的希望，更具有一种生生不息的创造力量，它可以把一切阴郁和绝望的因素排除在外。达赖喇嘛说，（录音）如果我们自己不采取任何行动，只等待度母的救度，那显然是一种错误的心态。

达赖喇嘛强调，（录音）作为一名佛学家和修学者，最重要的是必须要调伏好内心，如果不是那样，就会产生自大傲慢、相互嫉妒和诋毁等情况，这是不对的。

随后达赖喇嘛尊者开始向信众讲解第十四世达赖喇嘛所著的《中观根本论之大疏》。达赖喇嘛谦虚地指出，（录音）下面所要讲的是我所讲解被记录的相关中观内容，这本书籍是由居住在美国的一位华人佛学家来到印度北部达兰萨拉，聆听我的讲解后，按照录音内容进行整理后出版发行，并把《中观根本论之大疏》等相关佛教著作翻译成中文在中国大陆进行了发布。

按照议程，本周四（3日）和本周五（4日），达赖喇嘛将在西藏甘丹寺东顶学院对大众传授「大威德灌顶」；本月5日传授「弥勒开许灌顶」，当天下午将接受西藏僧俗民众供奉的「永驻长寿佛事仪轨」。

流亡西藏学生开展拯救藏语活动

【挪威西藏之声2月1日报导】

两名流亡西藏学生从上周日（30日）开始，在印度全国发起拯救藏语活动，呼吁印度学生和民众共同制止中共消灭西藏语言。

开展这一活动的流亡西藏学生次仁多吉今天（1日）接受本台采访时说，中国政府目前所采取的政策是完全要消灭西藏民族，这是我们决不能容忍的事情，许多西藏学生和老师因为捍卫藏语文而遭到打压，因此，我们开展了这一活动。

去年10月份，上千名西藏学生走上街头，要求中共当局停止执行改变现行政策，以汉语授课为主的教学改革。

这次流亡西藏学生次仁多吉和次拉加借助寒假期间，把印度首都新德里的国会大街作为起点，骑着自行车，正式发起了这一拯救藏语活动。他们两人是西藏流亡社区苏加学校十年级学生。

次仁多吉表示，在过去两天中，他们穿着显耀的衣服，向印度学生和民众发放了大量传单，内容包括中国政府在西藏计划执行旨在消灭西藏语言为目的的教育政策的本质，以及西藏学生境内学生的拯救母语运动等情况。

他说，印度学生纷纷表示中共在西藏计划推行汉语为主的教学政策是完全错误，每一个民族都有权保护和继承自己的母语，完全支持这次他们两人发起的挽救藏语活动。

两名西藏学生计划于今年3月10日「西藏三•十自由抗暴日」，将抵达终点站西藏流亡政府所在地达兰萨拉。